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How do organizations obtain access to valued resources without diluting the loy-
alties and identities of their members? Network analysts suggest focusing on the
boundary-spanning activities of “brokers” who bridge gaps in social structure. In
many contexts, however, brokers are viewed with suspicion and distrust rather than
rewarded for their diversity of interests. This dissertation examines organizations
in which the theoretical deck is seemingly stacked against brokerage and toward
parochialism: American-Italian mafia families. Through an institutional analysis of
the mafia organization, I trace how ethnic and organizational closure led marginalized
actors to seek alternative paths to enrichment beyond the family-controlled networks
and industries. Using a historical network data set, I document a division of net-
work labor in which a small number of brokers—often, surprisingly, ethnic outsiders
and lower-status criminals—bridged otherwise disconnected islands of criminal ac-
tivity. More than coordination among elite criminals, it was entrepreneurial action
by marginal and excluded actors—outsiders operating largely beyond the control
of mafia organizations themselves—that generated the integrated and highly con-
nected mafia network. This dissertation accounts for a striking historical paradox
by showing how it was possible for the American Mafia to appear for all intents and
purposes to be a well-organized national conspiracy even as the individual groups
involved remained organizationally and geographically separate from one another.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PUZZLE OF MAFIA ORGANIZATION
In May of 1950, the U.S. Senate formed a special committee led by Tennessee
Senator Estes Kefauver to investigate the extent of organized crime’s influence on
interstate commerce. Over the course of one year, the Kefauver Committee heard
testimony from more than 600 witnesses in 14 cities (U.S. Senate 1951). The con-
clusions drawn by Kefauver and his colleagues would ignite decades of subsequent
debate. The committee’s report read: “There is a nationwide crime syndicate known
as the Mafia...Its leaders are usually found in control of the most lucrative rackets
in their cities. There are indications of a centralized direction and control of these
rackets” (quoted in Bell 1953, p. 143). Amid dawning public and political awareness
of Italian-American criminal groups operating in many American cities, Kefauver
was far from alone. Prominent scholars, law enforcement officials, and political fig-
ures dedicated volumes to describing the American version of La Cosa Nostra, a
collection of criminal groups—or “families”—belonging to a centrally organized and
pseudo-bureaucratic entity controlling criminal rackets nationwide (e.g. Anderson
1965; Cressey 1969; U.S. Senate 1951).
Yet Kefauver’s assessment also invited quite understandable skepticism. A dis-
tinguished camp of dissenters quickly emerged to counter Kefauver’s claims of a
mafia conspiracy as myths stoked by overzealous politicians and aimed deliberately
at smearing recently immigrated Italian-Americans (Albini 1971; Bell 1953; Gallhier
and Cain 1974; Hess 1973). Most famously, the Harvard social scientist Daniel Bell
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bemoaned that “unfortunately for a good story—and the existence of the Mafia would
be a whale of a story,” investigations undertaken by the U.S. Senate had not “pre-
sented any real evidence that the Mafia exists as a functioning organization” (Bell
1953, p. 143). For Bell and others, Italian-Americans stuck in the lower rungs of the
class hierarchy in urban immigrant enclaves had taken to criminal activity just like
members of previous immigrant groups had done in earlier generations when finding
other ladders of opportunity blocked due to discrimination and accumulated disad-
vantage (also see Merton 1938). To frame such activity as evidence of a nationwide
criminal conspiracy was surely a bridge too far.
Few institutions are as well-studied and yet poorly understood as the American
Mafia. What exactly do we mean when we speak of this sphinx-like entity, one
that seems to take different shapes the closer one looks? Do we refer to a central
organization controlling criminal activity across the United States? Or, quite dif-
ferently, to a set of disjointed and largely unrelated local criminal assemblies? Or
perhaps, instead, to some combination of both? Previous work has struggled to re-
solve such questions convincingly, especially for lack of data and evidence that would
shed definitive light on the answers. Despite attempts by sociologists (Albini 1971;
Gambetta 1993), economists (Reuter 1983), historians (Lupo 2009), anthropologists
(Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972), and criminologists (Abadinsky 1983; Paoli 2003) to
describe and explain this social institution, the Mafia remains enigmatic in nature.
The fiercest debate—and one revisited in this dissertation—revolves around a de-
ceptively simple question: How organized is organized crime? Or, to put a slightly
different twist on it: How is organized crime organized?
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This dissertation provides the most extensive and large-scale analysis to date of
the network of criminal relationships that comprised the American Mafia at its mid-
20th century height of historical influence. Drawing on a unique archival data set with
rich biographical information on over 700 members and associates of 24 American
mafia families, I show that proponents of the “mafia conspiracy” correctly identified
the national scope of mafia organization, but misdiagnosed the mechanisms giving
rise to this organization. On one hand, the network of criminal affiliations linking
mafia members across U.S. cities reflects a cohesive and well-integrated structure that
would allow any single individual to reach any other through just a few well-placed
intermediaries. While the existence of such a national network clearly indicates that
the Mafia was not merely local and parochial in structure, however, neither does
it confirm the existence of a top-down organizational structure featuring centralized
control. Rather, by examining who produced the key inter-organizational links in the
mafia network—and under what conditions—I demonstrate that the cohesiveness of
this network owed largely to entrepreneurial criminals operating beyond the control
of formal mafia organizations. To this end, the dissertation identifies a great and
heretofore unexplored irony: American mafia families, despite their noted emphasis
on closed membership and undivided commitment, combined to form a national
criminal enterprise largely because of ties formed by outsiders excluded from the
power structures of those very same families.
While the Mafia is an important and consequential social institution in its own
right (Dixit 2004; Mastrobuoni and Patacchini 2012; Milhaupt and West 2000; Put-
nam et al. 1994; Schelling 1984), this dissertation uses the historical and empirical
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puzzle of mafia organization to engage theoretical puzzles with broader resonance.
And like all great puzzles, the ones addressed here have multiple layers, such that
peeling back one inevitably reveals more rather than less need for further explo-
ration. How do interorganizational networks balance local closure with integration
and openness? What are the consequences—both intended and unintended—when
organizations institute rules and norms to incentivize commitment and discourage
opportunism? How do individual actors balance the potential benefits of brokerage
against the reputation costs within a parochial group?
A skeptic would certainly suggest that we will find great difficulty in general-
izing the dynamics of social and economic organization in mafia families to other,
more familiar institutional contexts. While exotic to most social scientists, however,
the mafia family provides a surprisingly faithful analogue to units of organization
in a variety of non-criminal contexts. Like agents in other realms, mafiosi are en-
trepreneurial actors who seek individual gain within the constraints of membership
in solidaristic groups. Individuals balance the benefit of access to novel and non-
redundant information and resources against the risk of venturing outside of a closed
social circle. Groups are marked by norms of closure that restrict access to collec-
tive resources to those who carry the badge of membership. Yet, because members
of different groups have access to complementary resources, individuals and groups
alike have a cautious interest in non-parochial collaboration and coordination. In line
with the goal of speaking to broader theoretical puzzles, the theoretical mechanisms
discussed later in this introductory chapter will be presented in a sufficiently general
way as to invite application beyond the mafia context.
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Furthermore, the data set employed in the present study (discussed at length in
Chapter 2) is relatively unique in the literature on network organization for the gran-
ular detail it provides across multiple levels of analysis. Most notably, the data allow
me to analyze individuals and groups concurrently—and with regard both to network
organization within groups and to the structures of interconnection between groups.
Past studies have typically been restricted to analyzing ties among individuals or
between organizations, but not both simultaneously.
1.1 A Parochial Conspiracy
In his groundbreaking and widely-cited book The Sicilian Mafia, Diego Gambetta
(1993) argues that the Mafia is little more than a “brand name” whose adher-
ents sometimes—depending on the circumstance—loosely organize to form a cartel.
Within this structure, organizations or “families” act as firms and individual mafiosi
as clients of the firm.1 The defining feature of mafia business lies neither in the
provision of illegal goods (many of the goods dealt by mafiosi are legal) nor in the
exercise of violence (which is avoided whenever possible). Instead, the mafioso is
most efficiently seen as an entrepreneur of a specific good: protection. Protection
from whom? Often times, the mafioso himself.2 In other cases, however, the pur-
1Following convention, I use “mafioso” in the singular and “mafiosi;; in the plural to refer to
affiliates of mafia families. For my purposes, it is sufficient to say that this category would include
groups that were recognized by law enforcement and other families as part of the loose-knit national
“cartel” usually known as the American Cosa Nostra. While others have discussed at length the
distinction between mafiosi and other criminals (e.g. Gambetta 1993), such definitional issues are
at best a distant concern for my analysis.
2I use male pronouns throughout this dissertation to reflect the general limitation of membership
in a mafia family to males.
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chase of protection has more tangible benefits (besides ensuring that one’s kneecaps
remain intact). Gambetta illustrates this point with the example of an entrepreneur
of secondhand horses who purchases the services of mafioso Pepe in order to warn
potential sellers against trying to part with substandard animals (what Gambetta
terms “equine lemons”). The mafia thus operates as one form of “private ordering”
for the governance of economic exchange (also see Dixit 2004).
To understand the structure of economic exchange internal to the mafia ranks,
however, we must consider a somewhat different question: How does the mafioso
protect himself from the predation of other mafiosi? In other words, how do mafiosi
generate within their own membership that which they provide to outsiders? Here,
Gambetta’s answer—that the mafioso becomes his own customer in the protection
market—may be unsatisfying. While the mafioso clearly strives to cultivate a repu-
tation for violent capability, the danger is that one might actually be called upon to
prove it. Unfortunately for them, mafiosi are not exempt from the general human
tendency to be inefficient and sloppy in the exercise of violence (Collins 2008). In-
deed, attempts at dispute resolution through violence are regarded as a last resort
and prone to spectacular failure (Reuter 1983). Perhaps the most famous example is
mid-level mafioso Vincent “The Chin” Gigante’s failed 1957 assassination attempt on
New York boss Frank Costello, which was ruined when Gigante yelled at Costello—
thereby alerting him to the impending gunshot—just before firing.
Compounding this issue, the illegal nature of mafia business makes the legal en-
forcement of transactions impossible, eliminating the force of state-initiated property
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rights and contract law (Coase 1937; North 1990; Williamson 1996). Furthermore,
trust between mafiosi—which could grease the wheels of economic exchange (Macy
and Skvoretz 1998; Macy and Sato 2002; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994; Zucker
1986)—is a precious and limited resource in a market of hardened criminals (Gam-
betta 1993; Maas 1969; Reuter 1983). Some mistakenly take the symbolism of the
Mafia—particularly its emphasis on fictive kinship—as a sign of high trust. Gould
(1999) aptly points out that if group cohesion “were as strong as members say, they
would not need to talk about it quite so often” (p. 376). Similarly, Gambetta (1993)
suggests that the institutional myth of the mafioso as a “man of honor” (in contrast
to the common criminal) merely fulfills the “technical requirement” of an inflated
reputation (p. 46).
Bilateral or multilateral enforcement of agreed-upon business norms might pro-
vide an alternative governing mechanism (Ellickson 1991; Granovetter 1985; Greif
2006; Macaulay 1963; Nee and Opper 2012; Uzzi 1996). However, previous accounts
suggest that norm-breaking occurs frequently (Gambetta 1993, p. 7) and is irregu-
larly sanctioned; while the wronged mafioso can complain to the boss of the crime
family, the resulting judicial process—dependent on the boss’s individual allegiances
and whims—can be unpredictable (Maas 1969). And while the “shadow of the fu-
ture” (Axelrod 1984) may be sufficient to ensure good behavior in some exchanges,
the underground nature of mafia business makes it difficult even to find out if another
mafioso had wronged you. For instance, profit splits among mafiosi are handled infor-
mally by providing partners their “cut” or “vig,” providing opportunities for subtle
malfeasance.
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This inherent difficulty of trusting one’s potential business partners must affect
the resulting structure of economic exchange, as individual actors form ties on the
basis of an alter’s expected behavior and dissolve them in response to deviation
from those expectations. In particular, we might expect a lack of formal contract
enforcement combined with frequent norm-breaking and unscrupulous behavior to
produce a “toxic stew” of the sorts that lead actors to rely heavily on embedded
strong ties (e.g. Granovetter 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Uzzi 1996, 1997).
Within a densely connected network cluster, potential malfeasance is at least limited
by third-party pressures and the potential for negative reputational effects to spread
quickly among all of one’s potential dance partners. For the actor engaged in illegal
or underground economic activity, furthermore, network closure facilitates not only
the assurance of transactions but also the maintenance of secrecy and detection
avoidance (Baker and Faulkner 1993). Accordingly, scholars suspect that mafiosi
and other criminals construct their network of business associates with an eye to
network closure as a means of assurance, forming parochial cocoons with few bridging
ties between them (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Morselli 2005). Historical accounts of
mafia families as localized and parochial groups of “peasant entrepreneurs” fit such
accounts (Anderson 1965; Blok 1974).
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1.2 Institutional Incentives for Closure
Rather than attributing the possibility of economic exchange amongst mafiosi to
their individual capability for violence or to an imagined degree of ingrained trust,
then, a more robust explanation should start from the observation that mafiosi in-
tendedly developed particular institutional mechanisms—standards, rules, norms,
and customs—meant to provide a measure of assurance where trust is otherwise
scarce (and likely unwarranted). These mechanisms share a common emphasis on
the production of institutional closure and the regulation of access to mafia-controlled
resources. They are institutional in that they comprise rules of the game that govern
behavior across groups, cities, and even countries.
Institutional closure within the mafia family has three key elements. The first
is ethnic closure—only full-blooded Italians are permitted membership, providing a
foundation of homophilous similarity among mafiosi from different families. A non-
Italian could never become a “made man,” the importance of which lies partly in
that a made man could not be killed (in principle) without direct permission from
the boss of the family. While the origins of the rule of ethnic exclusion itself are
not entirely clear, perhaps the likeliest explanation is that American mafia leaders
simply felt impelled to maintain the definition of the mafioso as full-blooded Italian
because this was how it had been in Italy; though, of course, it also reinforced the
self-serving mythology of the mafioso as a “man of honor” fundamentally different
from the common criminal (Gambetta 1993).
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The second is organizational closure—mafia families, though loosely defined, cre-
ate internal labor markets that incentivize in-group fealty; advancement up the mafia
hierarchy thus depends on demonstrations of loyalty to the group. While assuaging
the assurance problem in transactions within the family, this internal career lad-
der simultaneously reduces the incentives for brokerage across groups, since mafiosi
whose network ties place them at the interstices of multiple groups might be viewed
as suspect from within their own group. Organizational closure also implies that
members of one mafia organization will be regarded as outsiders by other organiza-
tions, thus increasing the individual mafioso’s dependence on the patronage of his
home family.
The third is kin closure—mafia families grow out of actual families and are often
organized around kinship clusters. The closure of the kinship group in turn provides
a foundation for multiplex relations and enforceable trust (Peng 2004).
At the individual level, there are likewise added costs to exchange with associates
outside the family’s protective canopy. In clan-like groups that emphasize commit-
ment and loyalty, first, there is a potential reputation cost to doing too much of one’s
business with outsiders (Xiao and Tsui 2007). There is also an opportunity cost—
time and effort spent cultivating one relationship implies foregone opportunities to
cultivate others. To the extent that ranks (and the resources associated with them)
were distributed by way of internal labor markets within families (Gambetta 1993),
we should expect greater return on one’s social investment from interactions within
the family boundaries.
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In light of such factors, closure among mafiosi can be understood not as a result of
moral compulsion or blind collectivism but rather as a rational expenditure of one’s
social and economic capital in order to compete successfully for recognition in the
family hierarchy. Despite this, Reuter (1983) and other observers have noted that
longer-range ties of criminal association were not uncommon. How do we explain
the fact that mafia groups are simultaneously parochial and yet combine to form
a cohesive and well-integrated network? The solutions to this puzzle are encoded
in the network structure, which aggregates the choices made by individual mafiosi
concerning who to do business with and who to (either explicitly or implicitly) avoid.
The formation of network ties virtually always carries socioeconomic consequences
and thus involves some degree of strategy (Burt 1992). Yet, these consequences
are unusually acute for the mafioso, for whom the choice of partners not only affects
access to valuable social capital in the form of information, monitoring, and resources,
but could also be a matter of life or death.
1.3 Accounting for Interfamily Exchange
The standard mafia racket (i.e. the provision of “protection”) featured centralized
control: individual mafiosi gained access to the racket—a license to operate—by
way of patronage from their more powerful superiors within the family (Paoli 2003).
As noted by economist Peter Reuter (1983), however, other mafia industries were
comparatively open and decentralized. For the typical mafioso, these decentralized
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industries provided both unique requirements and opportunities that fostered ex-
change across otherwise rigid organizational boundaries. At the macro level, this
dynamic resulted in the bottom-up emergence of a cohesive and integrated interor-
ganizational network linking together rank-and-file mafiosi located in families across
the United States. In contrast to the more common image of interorganizational co-
ordination occurring through clandestine meetings of elite Mafia leaders, the mafiosi
forming these network bridges to other families were often those excluded from the
most powerful positions within their own families.
The production and distribution of narcotics represented the most notable and
historically important example of a highly decentralized industry featuring partici-
pation from many rank-and-file mafiosi but much fewer bosses and other mafia elites,
largely because it was held in poor regard by traditional mafia leaders (Gambetta
1993; Maas 1969). The crucial distinction was apparently not in who benefited from
the trade but rather in who assumed the costs of doing business. In his memoirs,
Valachi reports that the standard norms of patronage still applied, as he was forced
to provide both his capo and boss with their standard cut (“vig”) once they discov-
ered his involvement in a drug deal. If Valachi were arrested while dealing in drugs,
however, the family would not have provided him with legal representation, which
was otherwise understood to be a standard benefit of membership in a mafia family
(Maas 1969). Similarly, if Valachi were to find himself in conflict with a member of
another family as the result of a deal gone awry, the boss would not aid in dispute
settlement.
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Despite the taint of illegitimacy, a virtual army of mafiosi moved into the drug
trade, forming distribution channels that stretched across familial, regional, and
even national boundaries (U.S. Senate 1963). This national distribution network is
depicted graphically in Figure 1.1. Heroin imported from Canada and Europe flowed
from New England or upstate New York to the Five Families of New York City, from
where it could move to Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans, Houston, and other locales
where distribution would then be controlled by local criminals.
Discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4, the midcentury drug trade is useful
here as an existence proof that interfamily exchange was not limited to bosses and
other mafia elites. It also illustrates a broader point about the autonomy of the
mafioso, who was in principle free to do business with whomever he chose, whether
inside or outside of the family (Abadinsky 1983; Gambetta 1993; Maas 1969; Paoli
2003; Reuter 1983). To the extent that the mafia family can be usefully compared
to a firm, the mafioso is less an employee than a client. As such, he depends on the
family hierarchy for resources and patronage but otherwise has relative autonomy in
his business dealings (Haller 1992) .
Yet, there were practical limits to this autonomy. First, families featured patri-
monial organization—they maintained monopolistic control of property and adminis-
tered privileged access through personalistic patron-client ties (Collins 1975). Within
the family, one’s access increased with rank in the group hierarchy. Second, these
ranks were allotted through internal labor markets where one moved up the ladder







































loyalty (Gambetta 1993). Finally, the family identity was greedy—while the mafioso
could do business with members of other criminal outfits, he could only enjoy the
full benefits of membership in one family (Coser 1974). By thus internalizing and
restricting the distribution of resources to group members, mafia families sought to
ensure undivided commitment and obeisance among their members.
As suggested by Figure 1.1, however, the key task is not to explain whether
cross-family exchange among rank-and-file mafiosi existed but to account for how
such exchange was organized. Answering this question requires us to go beyond the
usual frame of network analysis, in which network structure is typically viewed as an
independent variable given a priori to explain another outcome of interest. Here, we
must instead begin with a theoretical model of individual behavior, which can then
be extended to explain the resulting network structure.
If the case of the mafia drug trade most vividly illustrates the puzzle of network in-
tegration across otherwise parochial and closed organizations, it also helpfully points
us toward the solution to this puzzle. Like economic actors in other contexts, the
mafioso has to negotiate a particular tension: To pursue opportunities for advance-
ment and enrichment within the boundaries of the larger organization or to pursue
entrepreneurial opportunities outside of the organization. In other organizational
contexts (see Sørensen and Sharkey 2014), this choice typically involves choosing be-
tween continuing one’s career path as an employee within an organization or selecting
into self-employed entrepreneurship, where this choice hinges in turn on the extent
to which better opportunities for advancement can be found outside the organiza-
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tional hierarchy. The mafioso can similarly be seen as choosing between focusing on
advancement through the industries or rackets controlled by his family (the path of
the organization man) versus pursuing extra-organizational opportunities (the path
of the entrepreneur). As touched on above and elaborated further in Chapter 4, the
drug trade belonged to this second category.
This behavioral model—which sees the mafioso as negotiating tradeoffs between
internal (intra-organizational) and external (extra-organizational) opportunities—
focuses our analytical attention in two ways. First, to the extent that individual
mafiosi having extensive network ties beyond the boundaries of their own family
suggests a focus on external rather than internal reward (namely, by focusing one’s
social capital outside the organization), explaining what types of individuals tended
to form such externally focused networks should feature prominently in any theory
of network integration. Second, this theory should account for individual participa-
tion in the drug trade—the key example of an industry that both lacked top-down
organizational control and required extensive connection across geographic and or-
ganizational boundaries.
Based on this model, I turn now to the identification of theoretical mechanisms
which might account for these patterns. These mechanisms focus specifically on
organizational- and individual-level factors determining what types of actors were
well-positioned to benefit from advancement within the organization or, instead, to




The network positions available to different actors in a particular context can be
explained by corresponding patterns of institutional closure. In the Weberian tradi-
tion, closure is defined as “the process by which social collectivities seek to maximize
rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunities to a limited circle of eligi-
bles” (Parkin 1974, p. 3; also see Weber 1978).3 This process of restricting access to
group-controlled resources to a defined group of insiders has implications for network
structure. Namely, if access to key resources is limited to group members and one’s
degree of access increases with rank or position within the group, the incentives for
intergroup brokerage are low among those who would instead prefer to attain high
status (and privileged access) in their own group. Rules and norms that institute
Weberian institutional closure, in other words, also tend to produce network closure,
defined as the absence of bridging connections between parochial groups. There need
not be formal sanctions involved for this tendency to hold. Indeed, perhaps the most
salient danger associated with brokerage activity is simply the risk of judgment from
other group members who may question one’s intentions, motivations, and commit-
ments (Xiao and Tsui 2007).
By distinguishing insiders from outsiders and placing a premium on insider sta-
tus, institutional closure also produces status heterogeneity. This heterogeneity can
3The institutional closure described here is often referred to more broadly as “social closure” in
the literature on professions and occupations (e.g. Parkin 1974; Weeden 2002). I use the former
rather than latter term to distinguish from the network usage of “social closure” in reference to the
presence of closed triads.
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in turn induce actors to pursue different positions in a network of exchange rela-
tions depending on whether they carry the mark of “belonging” to the group. In
organizational fields where multiple closed groups adopt similar standards of mem-
bership, exclusion from one group can imply exclusion from all others, while inclusion
in one group can preclude inclusion in any others. In such cases, “outsiderism” is
two-tiered. The “conditional outsider”—who belongs to one group and is therefore
excluded from others—is incentivized to stay within her group in order to remain in
good standing. However, institutional closure also defines “unconditional outsiders”
who cannot belong to any group. This unconditional outsider is then left with two
options: to either operate at the margins of one group or to act as a bridge be-
tween groups. The role of client to a single group is inherently insecure because it
lacks the structural autonomy that comes from having ties to diverse actors (Both-
ner et al. 2010). Therefore, the enterprising outsider may instead pursue a path of
entrepreneurial deviance, using her lack of membership in any particular group to
her advantage by seeking out brokerage positions bridging otherwise disconnected
(or only loosely connected) groups (a topic taken up in more detail in Chapter 3) or
by sorting into alternative “private orders” where exchange can take place outside
the regulating eye of the organization (the topic explored in Chapter 4).
These three interrelated mechanisms—institutional closure, status heterogeneity,
and entrepreneurial deviance—together account for a historical conundrum: That
the American Mafia was simultaneously a well-integrated national conspiracy and yet
comprised of largely local, parochial, and closed groups. Far from reflecting top-down
control by powerful mafia bosses, I argue that the integrative bridging ties formed by
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outsiders and marginal actors allowed for coordination and collaboration across mafia
families that otherwise had few ongoing connections to one another. Consequently,
what contemporary law enforcement and political figures saw as the residues of a
national “mafia conspiracy” was less a reflection of formal coordination between
families than of bottom-up entrepreneurial activity. Paradoxically, this bottom-up
activity allowed mafia families in cities across the United States to become linked into
a cohesive national network precisely because of their failure to regulate the behavior
of their members. Against social norms emphasizing closure and local solidarity
(Gambetta 1993), rank- and-file criminals formed diverse and wide-ranging networks
because doing so benefited their own attempts to profit from criminal activity.
The interplay of these three mechanisms also informs and challenges broader the-
ories of networks and institutions. Network theories have often explained cohesion
and integration as emerging as a byproduct of individual brokerage activity linking
together otherwise unconnected actors and groups. In Burt’s classic theory of “struc-
tural holes,” the incentives for individual actors to perform such brokerage activity
are implicit and inherent—since brokerage forms the foundation of social capital (e.g.
Burt 1992, 2000, 2004, 2005, 2012), agentic actors will seek to position themselves as
brokers. In contrast, the interplay of the three mechanisms described above positions
brokerage as one element in a division of network labor, and one that is incentivized
and rewarded for particular types of social actors rather than pursued in zero-sum
competition.
The reason is that institutional closure, designed to discourage opportunism and
19
incentivize fealty to the group, positions the broker as a potentially deviant and un-
trustworthy actor. The avoidance of brokerage thus has an isomorphic quality, with
actors competing to appear committed to group norms and therefore legitimate (e.g.
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Far from ensuring uniformity of behavior, however, the
interplay of these three mechanisms here instead implies a heterogeneity of behavior
as normative and competitive pressures are experienced differently depending on an
actor’s social position relative to the group. The same rules and norms that encour-
age closure and parochialism among insiders create opportunities for brokerage and
integration by outsiders operating beyond the normative constraints of group mem-
bership. Whereas institutional theory typically begins from the analysis of norms,
rules, and standards as constraints on individual agency, these same elements also
create opportunity structures for actors who find themselves defined as outsiders or
marginal figures within the institutional ecosystem.
1.5 Outline of Dissertation
To study the structure of economic and social relationships among mafia criminals, I
collected an archival data set—based on information compiled in 1960 by the Bureau
of Narcotics—featuring biographical details for more than 700 mafia members and
associates operating in various American cities, including a list of each member’s
known criminal associates. Chapter 2 introduces this unique network data set and
describes the key properties of the resulting structure. I show that the American
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Mafia was comprised of a set of separate yet also strongly intertwined islands of
criminal activity. Even though most mafia criminals only worked with other crim-
inals in the same city and family, a mafioso in San Francisco could still reach one
in Providence or Tampa through just a few degrees of separation. What explains
this paradox? Consistent with “small-world” network theory (Watts 1999; Watts
and Strogatz 1998), I demonstrate that a small number of network bridges between
otherwise disconnected groups was sufficient to drastically reduce the social distance
between different islands of criminal activity.
Given the need for localism and closure in order to make trust enforceable—
combined with the career benefits of undivided commitment to the family and the
potential risk of appearing disloyal—where did the bridging ties necessary for produc-
ing cohesion across mafia organizations come from? Addressing this puzzle, Chapter
3 analyzes the correlates and consequences of network brokerage at the level of in-
dividual criminals. I document a division of network labor in which a small number
of brokers—often, surprisingly, ethnic outsiders excluded from formal membership—
acted as bridges across the different regional islands of criminal activity. Further-
more, I show that ethnic outsiders and marginally positioned Italian criminals—but
not others—held power and influence within families especially when they were posi-
tioned to act as bridges between families. In sociological theorizing, social closure in
solidary groups is typically thought important because it places a heavy premium on
insider status and excludes outsiders from access to key resources. Yet, this analysis
shows that social closure can also paradoxically increase the returns to brokerage,
albeit only when taken up in a way that does not violate group norms.
21
This argument speaks to a tension between two longstanding lines of theorizing
in the social sciences. Network theorists, on one hand, emphasize the importance
of diverse affiliations that bridge gaps between otherwise disconnected groups; these
diverse ties are viewed as the foundation of power, influence, and social capital
(Burt 1992, 2004; Fernandez and Gould 1994; Granovetter 1973; Padgett and Ansell
1993). When access to key resources depends on good standing within a closed
group, however, individual actors who maintain bridging ties beyond the group’s
boundaries may be viewed with suspicion rather than rewarded for their diversity
of interests (Podolny and Baron 1997; Stovel and Shaw 2012; Xiao and Tsui 2007).
While individuals may benefit opportunistically from chances for brokerage across
group boundaries, furthermore, the power and influence they gain may come at the
expense of other group members. Consequently, organizational theorists generally
emphasize institutional closure—norms, rules, and regulations that restrict the flow
of resources to insiders of a closed group—as the means through which groups make
loyalty and undivided commitment attractive to members and thereby discourage
opportunistic behavior that might weaken the group as a whole (Coser 1974; Parkin
1974; Weber 1978). I bridge these arguments by showing that institutional closure—
in this case, rules and norms that mafia families used to regulate membership and
ensure loyalty among their members—can enable diverse brokerage activity among
outsiders even as it restricts the same activities among insiders.
In addition to exclusion from family membership, competition within families
also indirectly birthed opportunities for inter-family exchange. Chapter 4 examines
the case of the mafia drug trade. Since the drug trade required coordination across
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regional and even national boundaries, it was a major source of network cohesion.
Yet, the organization of the drug trade differed in important ways from other mafia
rackets. Since involvement in narcotics was formally discouraged by many of the most
powerful bosses and mafia elites, the industry lacked top-down regulation. Despite
this taint of illegitimacy, the drug trade featured broad-based participation by the
1950s. While this is often intuitively viewed as evidence that mafia families lacked
formal organization, I suggest the opposite.
Sicilian mafia families had generally been small in membership and forced to
compete against dozens of rival factions even within the same city or regional terri-
tory (Gambetta 1993). In contrast, the American Mafia featured a smaller number
of families—generally one per city—with larger memberships and monopoly con-
trol over a larger region of operation. While this engendered competition for posi-
tions of influence within the family hierarchy, it also drove excluded and relatively
more marginal members into nominally deviant activities such as the drug trade—
disapprovingly viewed as an especially dirty business by the most influential mafia
bosses (Gambetta 1993; Maas 1969). This analysis crystallizes the dissertation’s
broader empirical argument: More than coordination among bosses and other elite
criminals, it was entrepreneurial action by marginal and excluded actors—outsiders
operating largely beyond the control of mafia organizations themselves—that gener-
ated the integrated and highly connected mafia network.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SECRET SOCIETY AND THE SMALL WORLD
A long line of research on criminal and covert networks has emphasized the crit-
ical tradeoff between efficiency and security (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Erickson
1981; Morselli et al. 2007). On one hand, efficient communication across network
structure—facilitating timely collective action—depends on low average path lengths,
meaning that most nodes can be reached from others either directly or through just
a few intermediaries. On the other hand, the integrative ties enabling such efficiency
can also make the network less secure when one “discovered” node can easily lead to
the discovery of many others.
While previous work has generally analyzed this tradeoff in the context of net-
works surrounding individual criminals, covert organizations, or conspiratorial in-
cidents (e.g. Baker and Faulkner 1993; Campana and Varese 2013; Morselli 2005;
Morselli et al. 2007; Papachristos and Smith 2014), the same logic of efficiency and
security can be applied to the organization of relations across criminal organizations.
To this end, this chapter draws on a unique database compiled in 1960 by the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics containing biographical information on 726 prominent members
and associates of Italian-American mafia families operating in the United States. Us-
ing organizational charts produced by contemporaneous U.S. Senate investigations—
together with label propagation techniques from computer science to fill the gaps in
the historical record—I map the individual criminal profiles onto membership in 24
mafia families. Based on ties of criminal association identified in these profiles, I
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produce a novel network image of the mid-century American mafia as a set of highly
differentiated yet intertwined islands of criminal activity.
In making this empirical advance, I theoretically extend the efficiency-security
tradeoff to the analysis of inter-organizational relations through the concept of net-
work modularity (Newman 2006; Newman and Girvan 2004). While some criminal
industries—such as the distribution of narcotics—require coordination across geo-
graphic space, the extensive network ties required for such coordination may make
the network less secure by allowing the discovery of any one conspirator to impli-
cate multiple organizations. Yet the absence of bridging ties between organizations
makes intergroup coordination impossible or, at the least, inefficient. Capturing this
balance, modularity measures the fraction of network ties occurring within groups
compared to the fraction one would expect in a randomly constructed network of the
same size and degree distribution. Thus, high modularity in an inter-organizational
criminal network suggests a stronger emphasis on organizational security rather than
transactional efficiency.
The analysis finds that the mafia network featured extremely high levels of
clustering by group or family. Following the logic of Watts and Strogatz’s (1998)
“small-world” theory, however, it also turns out that a relatively small number of
“bridging” connections was sufficient to ensure relatively low average path length
between members of different families. While this structure is broadly consistent
with previous observations of criminal networks (e.g. Morselli 2009b), the key is
to identify the criminal “brokers” who link together the disparate clusters by form-
25
ing bridging ties beyond their own group (e.g. Baker and Faulkner 1993; Klerks
2001; Krebs 2002; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009a,b; Bouchard and Nguyen 2010;
Bright et al. 2012, 2015; Calderoni 2012; Mancuso 2014; Papachristos and Smith
2014; Mastrobuoni 2015). To this end, I show that—rather than widely dispersed—
the key network bridges were disproportionately concentrated among relatively few
actors. Furthermore, I find that the occupancy of such inter-organizational brokerage
positions features a U-shaped correlation with status and centrality within organiza-
tions, suggesting that brokerage roles were generally taken either by especially low-
or high-status—but not middle-status—actors. This apparent pattern of “middle-
status conformity” (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) in the occupancy of brokerage
positions sheds important light on the potential mechanisms allowing for intercon-
nection between criminal organizations. In particular, to the extent that brokerage
is avoided by middle-status members of a criminal group, we might suspect that
inter-organizational integration reflects individualistic enterprise—and even a form
of deviance from group expectations—rather than group-level coordination.
In relation to the rest of the dissertation, this chapter (based closely on Del-
laPosta 2017) has a twofold purpose. The first goal is to introduce the data and
methodological apparatuses that will act as the workhorses for subsequent analysis.
The second goal is to give a synthetic descriptive view of the network structure of the
American Mafia. Subsequent chapters will explore in greater detail the mechanisms
that gave rise to this structure.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides
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theoretical motivation of the mechanisms underlying the tradeoffs between efficiency
and security and between intragroup cohesion and intergroup connectivity in criminal
networks. Then, after some brief historical and empirical background for the present
study of mid-20th century American mafia families, I will introduce an archival
dataset that allows us to re-create the network of relations within and between these
families. The subsequent sections will present results from three sets of network
analyses. The first analysis uses the concept of network modularity to demonstrate
the extent to which intrafamily closure dominated the American mafia’s network
structure. The second analysis shows that, despite such closure, the national network
was nonetheless marked by high intergroup connectivity and integration. Taking up
this puzzle, the third analysis shows that this integration was enabled by a division
of network labor in which intergroup bridges were disproportionately maintained by
a relatively small number of actors, and that the occupancy of such bridges was
nonlinearly correlated with one’s status within the family hierarchy. I then conclude
by briefly summarizing the chapter.
2.1 Secrecy, Trust, and Closure
Erickson (1981) defines a secret society “in social network terms as a persisting pat-
tern of relationships which directly or indirectly links the participants in related
secret activities” (p. 189). Baker and Faulkner (1993) describe the security imper-
ative in such covert networks thusly: “When a secret society works properly, the
larger society remains unaware of its existence. If a secret society is discovered and
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investigated, its organizational structure should offer protection by making it difficult
to unravel the conspiracy” (p. 843). The imperative for efficiency in the structure
of such networks is that the pattern of relationships linking members together must
enable them to communicate and coordinate for whatever purpose (e.g. carrying out
a planned attack or consummating an illegal transaction) the network exists. As
Morselli et al. (2007) put it: “At some point, the hidden group must step forward
and execute a crime” (p. 144).
Security in the covert network can be enhanced through both top-down and
bottom-up mechanisms. In his classic essay on the subject, Simmel (1950) highlights
top-down organizational features that help to keep the “secret society” secret. Chief
among these is a rigid hierarchy that de-individualizes particular members and in-
sulates leaders from the rank-and-file. In addition to socializing members into the
group and its purposes (a process that is also often aided by elaborate initiation
rituals), limitations on direct communication among members also ensure that the
discovery of any one member is unlikely to lead to the discovery of many others
(Baker and Faulkner 1993). Thus, covert networks are often thought to be sparse
and decentralized in structure.
Erickson (1981) emphasizes on-the-ground conditions that lead individual mem-
bers of the secret society to build networks aimed toward trust and closure rather than
openness and integration. Based on a comparative analysis of six cases—including
the Lupollo mafia outfit chronicled by Ianni and Reuss-Ianni (1972)—Erickson high-
lights variation in social structure stemming from the riskiness of the conditions faced
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by the group. Risky conditions, she argues, make it especially important to rely on
pre-existing networks of relationships. With each new member who is recruited to
the secret group, both the recruiter and recruited are at risk of being exposed and
betrayed by the other. Accordingly, recruitment of new members and the formation
of new covert ties proceeds along paths of existing relations, where the prior contact
between recruiter and recruited provides a measure of trust. Furthermore, the ties
most likely to provide this requisite trust are parochial “strong” ties, such as those
within kinship groups. Consequently, network ties formed in the context of criminal
or covert activity are unlikely to be the “weak” ties that bridge large gaps between
distant social groups lacking a previous basis for connection (Granovetter 1973).
In the context of criminal networks spanning multiple organizations, Erickson’s
(1981) argument for heavy reliance on strong ties and pre-existing relations sug-
gests that members will be especially likely to focus on building ties within—rather
than across—organizations. There is a transaction cost to identifying trustworthy
partners for exchange outside of one’s own group. Within the organization, dense
social networks and hierarchical authority can combine to discourage malfeasance
and ensure conformity to group expectations. Beyond these organizational bound-
aries, however, one must increasingly rely instead on interpersonal trust lacking such
built-in assurances.
For these reasons, we should expect an inter-organizational criminal network to
feature a strong bias toward social closure in which intra-group connections dominate
the network’s structure. This closure can decrease the efficiency of the network when
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members of one group are foreclosed to communication and potential coordination
with individuals in other regions of the network. In extreme cases, individual groups
might appear in the network as “caves” disconnected from others. Perhaps more
likely, they can resemble a chain of islands with high internal cohesion balanced by
a modest number of bridges linking the groups together. The task of this chapter is
to describe—and begin to explain—this balance between closure and integration in
the context of a geographically widespread inter-organizational criminal network.
2.2 Reconstructing the Mafia Network
I began this dissertation by recalling the political and scholarly debate that emerged
from early investigations, mostly carried out under the auspices of U.S. Senate com-
mittees, into the existence, activity, and structure of Italian-American mafia fami-
lies.1 These initial volleys formed the foundation for two emergent theoretical camps,
positing either bureaucratic organization—emphasizing hierarchical structure and
centralized control (e.g. Cressey 1969)—or patrimonial organization—emphasizing
loose patronage structures rooted primarily in kinship and other local relationships
(e.g. Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972)—as the foundation of social and economic struc-
ture in Italian-American organized crime.
Subsequent investigation—including the published confession of New York
mafioso Joseph Valachi (Maas 1969)—refined the bimodal arguments. On one hand,
1For more examples of this early debate, see Anderson (1965), Cressey (1969), Albini (1971),
and Gallhier and Cain (1974).
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Daniel Bell was correct in disputing the existence of a single “functioning organi-
zation” controlling American-Italian organized crime in all major cities. Valachi
described a much less centralized structure comprised of many independent crim-
inal organizations, more commonly termed “families.” Each family was generally
governed according to an internal hierarchy that usually featured a boss, several ca-
poregimes (captains), and soldiers reporting to a caporegime. The simplest evidence
that these families did not comprise a single overarching organization is that one
could not simultaneously be a member of multiple families.
Like their Sicilian progenitors, however, American families formed a loose con-
federation based on mutual recognition (Paoli 2003). One of the earliest pieces of
evidence for some degree of national coordination came in 1957 when federal officers
raided a farm in Apalachin, New York, where more than 50 prominent mafiosi from
locales as far-flung as Tampa, Los Angeles, and Denver had assembled for a national
meeting. Valachi later attested to the existence of a national Commission on which
the most prominent mafia bosses in the United States sat. In fact, this Commission
had existed since at least the 1930s, two decades before a similar body first emerged
among Sicilian families (Maas 1969; Paoli 2003). Though often misconstrued as a
“board of directors” or ruling council imposing organizational unity across mafia
families, the Commission’s main function was apparently that of an informal con-
duit allowing bosses to coordinate joint ventures, mediate disputes between families,
report on the initiation of new members, and foster exchange with counterpart fam-
ilies in Sicily and southern Italy (Abadinsky 1983). In his published memoirs, New
York boss and former Commission member Joseph (Bonanno 1983) wrote that the
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Commission had no formal mechanism to impel compliance, but rather “had respect
only insofar as its individual members had respect. More than anything else, the
Commission was a forum” (p. 159).
Network analysis of the relationships both within and between families offers a
promising avenue for further investigating the balance between bureaucratic and pat-
rimonial organization—and, more broadly, between networked interconnection and
local closure—in the American Mafia. In taking this approach, the present chap-
ter builds on previous work investigating mafia networks in Europe (e.g. Berlus-
coni 2014; Calderoni 2014; Scaglione 2011; Varese 2006) and the United States (e.g.
Mastrobuoni and Patacchini 2012; Mastrobuoni 2015; Papachristos and Smith 2014;
Smith and Papachristos 2016), as well as previous work on inter-group relations in
criminal networks more generally (Malm et al. 2011; Malm and Bichler 2011). Most
importantly, this previous work emphasizes the degree to which network structure in
organized crime conforms entirely to neither bureaucratic nor patrimonial modes of
organization, but is rather contingent, variable, and fluid depending on circumstance
(also see Lombardo 1994).
Using data contained in an unusually detailed dossier compiled in 1960 by the Bu-
reau of Narcotics, I reconstruct the network of criminal association among prominent
members and associates of all known mafia families operating in the United States
during the mid 20th-century heyday of American organized crime. While only 50
copies of the dossier were originally produced (and none intended for public con-
sumption), it was declassified and published in mimeographed form in 2007 (Bureau
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of Narcotics 2007). The dossier compiles criminal profiles for known mafia members
and associates in the first large-scale attempt—following a decade of congressional
hearings and dawning public awareness—to aggregate all that was known about the
various mafia groups operating across the United States at the time.
The profiles themselves have a straightforward and relatively standardized for-
mat. Each contains summary sections on demographic background (including date
and place of birth), geographic residence, known relatives, past criminal record, and
involvement in legitimate businesses (including non-criminal professional or occupa-
tional affiliations), as well as a list of known criminal associates and a brief synopsis
of the individual’s role in mafia affairs. All of the profiled individuals were alive as
of 1960, although hand-written notes in the margins sometimes report deaths that
occurred in 1961 or 1962.
Each profile includes a list of the person’s known criminal associates. These
ties of criminal association are different from ties of direct communication gathered
through wiretaps and similar records. Rather than focusing on any single instance of
communication, the ties of criminal association are meant to capture the broader ar-
ray of relationships facilitating collaboration in criminal affairs among mafiosi. They
also reflect the local knowledge of investigators, since the Bureau of Narcotics in
particular was known to have undercover operations in major mafia families (Maas
1969).2 As pointed out recently by Agreste et al. (2016), reconstructions of mafia
2Despite the Bureau’s nominal emphasis on the drug trade, furthermore, longtime director Harry
Anslinger’s investigative interest in the mafia dated to the 1930s and extended well beyond mafia
involvement in narcotics (see McWilliams 1990 for a comprehensive institutional history of the
Bureau of Narcotics). Information collected by the Bureau led to several major law enforcement
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networks from wiretaps and related communication records—despite the many in-
sights gleaned from such studies—are limited by the fact that the criminals known
to rank most highly in the organization seldom appear most centrally in the commu-
nication network. This is not the case for the network of criminal association studied
here, in which bosses and other high-ranking mafia leaders consistently occupy more
central roles in the network. Still, we should be cognizant of the many ways in which
the source of criminal network data can impact the resulting structures (Rostami
and Mondani 2015). To this end, one apparent benefit of the Bureau of Narcotics
data set is that its ties of criminal association clearly draw from a combination of
available information from intelligence and investigations, criminal co-offending, and
even collaboration in legal enterprises, thus lessening the risk of “missing” important
connections.3
One expects, as with virtually all data sources, that the information in the dossier
is subject to occasional error. There would be graver concern if data were inaccurate
or missing in a manner that is systematically related to the key predictors or outcomes
of interest. From the available evidence, there is little reason to believe this to
be the case. Still, the individuals profiled by the Bureau of Narcotics were not a
random sample of those with any degree of mafia involvement—instead, they were
coups during the 1950s—particularly the successful raid of the 1957 national mafia meeting in
Apalachin, New York. Another indicator of the Bureau’s contemporary influence is that other
written documents from the time period seemingly relied on Bureau-provided descriptions when
available; for example, journalist Peter Maas (1969, p. 238) can retrospectively be found quoting
directly from the then-unpublished dossier in The Valachi Papers when describing Pasquale Pagano,
one of mafioso-turned-informant Joseph Valachi’s acquaintances.
3As pointed out by Rostami and Mondani (2015), however, there are other biases that might
remain, particularly those stemming from anchoring and “halo” effects.
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individuals thought to be important or influential in mafia affairs. This non-random
selection would mainly be a concern if figures excluded from the dossier were in
fact well-integrated in the mafia network. Though this cannot be entirely ruled out,
circumstantial evidence suggests that it is unlikely. While there are cases in which
individuals with no profile of their own appear in a profiled mafioso’s list of associates,
in nearly all such cases the un-profiled individual did not appear in any other profiled
mafioso’s list. In most of the remaining cases, further investigation revealed that the
un-profiled individual was recently deceased or had otherwise retreated from active
mafia affairs by 1960. Similarly, while the lists sometimes include redacted names,
these redactions apparently target (as one would expect) individuals who are not
themselves profiled in the dossier.
In previous work, Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012) have independently intro-
duced and analyzed the American mafia network as reconstructed from the Bureau of
Narcotics dossier (also see Mastrobuoni 2015). Among other findings, they show that
the most central mafiosi tended to be those who were older, Sicilian born, connected
to diverse illegal and legal enterprises, and tied to other mafiosi through intermarriage
and kin relations. While this analysis has many merits, it only indirectly addresses
the question of closure and integration across mafia families. Indeed, Mastrobuoni
and Patacchini (2012) explicitly show that the ties of intermarriage focused upon in
their analysis appeared to solidify alliances within already-established network clus-
ters rather than bridging larger distances and producing network integration (p. 34).
More crucially, Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012) do not explicitly map individual
mafiosi to the family organizations to which they belonged, meaning that their anal-
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ysis does not directly analyze interorganizational network structure. In contrast, I
approach this question directly by drawing on both historical sources and compu-
tational induction to map individual mafiosi to the known mafia organizations with
which they were affiliated, and then analyzing the resulting structure of relations
across these organizations.
I first generate the network of ties between mafia criminals by linking any two
individuals connected by a tie of criminal association. Since “association” implies
a bi-directed tie, I do not require that both individuals appear in the other’s list;
rather, any two individuals are tied if one appears in the other’s list of criminal
associates. As discussed more extensively later, the asymmetry in which person A
appears in person B’s list but B does not appear in A’s list usually reflects the
dossier creators’ attempts to prioritize associates based on the closeness of the tie
or the relative importance of the person being listed. I exclude from the network 19
“isolates” lacking ties of criminal association with any other profiled criminals. This
leaves a network of 707 U.S.-based mafiosi with 2,801 total ties among them and
an average degree of 7.92.4 The network is well-connected: All but five mafiosi are
contained in a single large connected component in which any node can be reached
from any other.
4The non-U.S. mafiosi in the dossier were generally international drug traffickers or deportees
who at one time resided in the U.S. Despite ties to some American mafiosi, however, exploratory
analysis suggested that the non-U.S. mafiosi constituted distinct groups and therefore should not
simply be considered associates of American mafia families. Gambetta (1993) quotes from a North
American mafioso who explains: “If [someone] lives [in Italy]...he can’t be one of us” (p. 117).
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2.3 Modularity and Group Closure
Having reconstructed the network of ties between individual mafiosi, the next task
is to match each individual to an affiliated mafia family. Since mafiosi could only
belong to one family, furthermore, these inferred memberships must be exclusive.
Historical and archival sources suggest that the number of independent mafia fam-
ilies operating in the United States has generally varied between 20 and 30 (Maas
1969; Paoli 2003; U.S. Senate 1988, 1963). I identify 24 such groups with at least one
affiliate in the Bureau of Narcotics dossier.5 Individuals are linked to families using
a combination of archival sources and computational induction. The Bureau dossier
generally describes each mafioso’s family affiliation in terms of geography (e.g. as a
member of the “Detroit mafia group”). While sufficient for inferring family mem-
bership in most cases, geographic categorization fails when multiple mafia families
occupied the same city or region. The notable examples are New York City, which
had five mafia families, and Miami, which was an open territory featuring mafiosi
from several different families. For such cases, I first supplemented information from
5Estimates can vary based on the classification of smaller mafia outfits as either independent
families or subsidiary “crews” of another family. I have made several coding decisions in this regard.
First, I include mafia affiliates from the Rochester and Utica-Rome areas of New York as part of
the Buffalo family. Rochester was only regarded as an independent family in later years. While
the Utica-Rome faction seems to have operated with some degree of autonomy, the faction leader
was usually regarded as a capo in the Buffalo family rather than an independent boss. Following
evidence presented in Joseph Valachi’s U.S. Senate testimony (1963), I code the Newark group as a
faction of the Genovese family. While the Springfield, I.L. group is sometimes regarded as a faction
of the Chicago family, I code it separately based on Valachi’s categorization of Springfield leader
Frank Zito as a mafia boss and by the fact that Zito represented himself independently at the 1957
Apalachin meeting (Maas 1969). Also, while historical accounts say little about the Omaha group,
I have coded them as a separate family due to the lack of evidence for any affiliation with other
families (in fact, the five-person Omaha group is the only one that does not belong to the same
network component as the other 23 families).
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the Bureau dossier with several membership lists printed in the proceedings from
a 1963 U.S. Senate special committee on organized crime. Most importantly, these
charts included the complete known membership lists for the five New York families.
Together, archival sources furnished family affiliations for 68 percent of individuals.
Following the rule that one cannot belong simultaneously to multiple families, all
individuals are matched to one family of primary affiliation.
To assess the extent to which network ties were concentrated within families, I
rely on Newman and Girvan’s (2004) measure of modularity. Modularity Q gives the
fraction of edges (network ties) that occur within communities (i.e. mafia families)
minus the expected fraction of within-community edges in a random network with




(eii − a2i ) (2.1)
where communities are indexed by i, eii represents the fraction of edges within com-
munity i, and ai =
∑
j eij where other communities (besides i) are indexed by j.
Thus, ai gives the total fraction of edges that connect to community i. In a random
network, eij = aiaj. High modularity indicates that dyadic relations are heavily
constrained to occur within rather than across group boundaries. Among the 478
nodes with known family affiliations, we observe modularity Q = .61, which indi-
cates a heavy preponderance of within-group ties; generally, networks with Q > .3
are thought to feature strong community structures (Newman and Girvan 2004, p.
8).
On this basis, we can reasonably assign family affiliations for the remaining
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229 individuals based on the dominant affiliations among those in their egocentric
network—in essence, assuming that one most likely belongs to the family with whose
members one most associates. Using Raghavan, Albert, and Kumara’s (2007) “label
propagation” algorithm, the network is first initialized such that the 478 individuals
with known affiliations are labeled accordingly. Unlabeled nodes are then selected in
random order to acquire the label that is most popular among their network alters.
This procedure continues until every previously unlabeled node eventually holds the
label that occurs with the highest frequency among its alters. In contrast, a purely
inductive approach (assigning family affiliations without any a priori knowledge)
would err by assuming away part of the problem—two or more families with exten-
sive ties to one another could be classified as one group. The approach taken here
instead combines extensive prior information on family affiliations with a simple
computational method designed to fill the gaps in this prior knowledge.
The label propagation routine produces classification solutions that vary across
independent replications due to two sources of stochasticity: (1) the random order
in which nodes update their labels and (2) the random breaking of ties between
equally popular labels (Raghavan et al. 2007). To ensure robust classifications, I
compared many independent replications of the propagation routine; the Rand index
of classification agreement for paired networks was in all checked cases higher than
.95. (Given the large number of fixed “seeds” with known affiliations, the similarity
across runs is not particularly surprising.) For simplicity and robustness, I use each
person’s modal family affiliation across 100,000 replications.
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Table 2.1 gives membership counts for all 24 families both before and after this
procedure. Unsurprisingly, there is wide variation in family size, including several
very large New York families (particularly the Genovese, Lucchese, and Gambino
families), sizable Midwest contingents in Chicago and Detroit, moderately sized out-
fits in cities such as New Orleans and Los Angeles, and a number of smaller groups—
including the Springfield family with just two identified affiliates—in other locales.
As expected, furthermore, the main effect of the label propagation routine is to iden-
tify main families of affiliation for New York-based mafiosi whose primary allegiances
among the five N.Y.C. families were previously unclear from archival sources.
The mafia network (after label propagation) features modularity Q = .56, indi-
cating that the network structure is dominated by internally cohesive and externally
differentiated closed groups. Notably, this statistic is not dramatically lower than
the modularity when only examining the 478 individuals whose family affiliations
were inferred from archival sources independent of the label propagation algorithm
(Q = .61). This confirms that the high level of closure in the mafia network is not
simply “baked in” by the label propagation procedure.
Figure 2.1 visualizes this network structure with nodes colored according to family
affiliation. In the figure, families are clustered and relatively clearly demarcated from
one another. Of course, much of this group closure would seem to reflect geographic
proximity. Given the local scope of the protection racket and many other mafia
businesses, a high degree of network differentiation among families located in different
cities and regions is hardly surprising (Gambetta 1993). However, Figure 2.2 “zooms
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Table 2.1: Number of mafiosi affiliated with each family before and after label
propagation







Elizabeth, N.J. 4 4
Buffalo 17 18
Pittston, P.A. 18 19
Pittsburgh 6 6
Philadelphia 13 13
New England 9 10
Detroit 42 47
Chicago 38 42
Kansas City 18 19
St. Louis 11 11
Cleveland 11 19
Springfield, I.L. 2 2
Omaha 5 5




Los Angeles 24 32
San Francisco 15 17
Total: 478 707
in” to depict network ties only among mafiosi affiliated with the five N.Y.C. families
(Genovese, Lucchese, Gambino, Profaci, and Bonanno). Compared to Q = .56 in
the larger network, the modularity in this N.Y.C. sub-network decreases to Q = .33.
In the network visual, family boundaries are more difficult to distinguish than in the
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national network. Yet, even within a single city, the degree of network clustering
remains relatively high and any given mafioso is much more likely to share a network
tie with someone in the same family (I will have more to say about the uniqueness
of the five N.Y.C. families in Chapter 3).
2.4 Network Integration
Despite the high modularity of the mafia network, the structure nonetheless retains
other features associated with the potential for efficient communication and reacha-
bility across group boundaries. Figure 2.3 depicts the bridging ties between families.
With the exception of the disconnected Omaha cluster, all other families are tied
into a single network component. While closeness in the interfamily network often
correlates with geographic nearness, even families located on opposite coasts could
be linked through bridging ties. One simple measure of network integration would
be to find how many nodes can be placed into a single bicomponent—defined as a
grouping within which any node can reach any other through at least two indepen-
dent pathways. When most nodes fit within a single bicomponent, the network is
integrated in the sense that individuals have multiple different ways of reaching those
with whom they are not directly connected (Erikson and Bearman 2006). For the
mafia network, 94 percent of nodes (665 of 707) fit within a single bicomponent.
Another indicator of integration and efficiency is the average path length of the
graph, or the average number of network steps between pairs of nodes. For the mafia
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Figure 2.1: The American mafia network
Note: Nodes are colored according to family membership and sized according to degree.
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Figure 2.2: The Five Families of New York City
Note: Nodes are colored according to family membership and sized according to degree.
network, this quantity equals 3.92, indicating that most pairs of mafiosi—even those
operating in different cities and families—were just a few degrees of separation apart
in the national network. This combination of high local clustering and inter-cluster
connectivity observed in the mafia network is consistent with the small-world network
structures famously described by Watts and Strogatz (1998). The co-presence of
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these seemingly contradictory properties minimizes the tradeoff between security
and efficiency because it provides for both dense local networks in which trust and
assurance are likely to be higher (Coleman 1988) and well-integrated networks that
keep opportunity costs low by allowing both direct and indirect access to diverse
resources located in other network clusters (Burt 1992, 2004; Granovetter 1973).
A more formal test of the small-world properties of the mafia network can be made
by comparing the observed network to “rewired” random networks of the same size
with regard to two quantities: (a) the average path length (APL) between two nodes
in the network and (b) the clustering coefficient (CC)—defined as the proportion of
closed triads (transitive structures in which an A connected to B who is connected
to C also implies that A and C are connected)—of the network (Watts 1999; Watts
and Strogatz 1998; Uzzi and Spiro 2005). I generated 10,000 simulated random
rewirings of the mafia network and compared each of them to the empirically observed
structure. Random networks are marked first by low average path lengths, owing
to the lack of local clustering. In a small-world structure, however, the APL should
not be dramatically higher than in a comparable random network. The average APL
across the random networks was 3.40, compared to just 3.92 in the observed network.
In contrast, the clustering coefficient for an observed small-world network should far
exceed that of comparable random networks. This was also the case for the mafia
network, in which the observed CC was .23 compared to an average of just .011 in the
random networks. The small world quotient is defined as the clustering-coefficient
ratio (observed to random) / path-length ratio (observed to random); the greater
this quotient, the more the network resembles a small-world structure. The mafia
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Figure 2.3: Bridging ties between mafia families
Note: Nodes are collapsed by family and sized by membership count. Edges are weighted by the
number of network ties between members of the respective families.
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network averages 17.67. For reference, this small-world quotient exceeds those for
two of the three example small-world networks originally used by Watts and Strogatz
(1998).
To briefly step back, this chapter so far has applied a combination of archival
records and computational induction to address a version of what network analysts
refer to as the “boundary specification” problem (Laumann et al. 1992). At the
network level, as discussed in section 2.2, the social system under investigation has
been broadly defined to include individual actors who were prominent enough by
reputation for inclusion in a dossier meant to comprehensively cover major known
members and affiliates of Italian-American mafia families. This set of families in
turn includes groups who, based on contemporary accounts cited extensively in the
previous substantive discussions, would have plausibly recognized one another as
belonging to a common enterprise with ethnic and organizational roots in the Sicilian
Cosa Nostra.
In identifying a meaningful set of groups within the network, I have relied on
the assumption that the boundaries between (usually geographically defined) mafia
organizations are the most useful and consequential for further analysis. This as-
sumption needs justification. An alternative approach would have been to make no
such assumptions, instead inductively defining relevant network groupings based on
an uninformed community detection algorithm or some similar clustering technique.
I favor the former (informed) approach for two main reasons. First, it is better suited
to answering the main puzzle of how otherwise relatively closed mafia families com-
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bined to form an integrated and cohesive national network. Defining organizational
boundaries and then examining the network connections that bridge those bound-
aries allows us to problematize the structure of integration in a way that would be
difficult if groups were defined purely by induction; in cases where two organiza-
tions were closely tied through network bridges, the inductive approach may simply
categorize the two organizations as representing a single group, thereby assuming
away the question of how the two organizations came to be closely tied in the first
place. Second, the approach taken here gives credence to the social reality described
in every first-person account of which I am aware, in which affiliation with a mafia
family is viewed as a consequential and meaningful organizational commitment, al-
beit not one that is so totalizing as to completely preclude all extra-organizational
relationships. This point should become especially evident in Chapters 3 and 4 when
I demonstrate the consequences of different modes of family organization for the
behavior of members.
Additionally, the empirical evidence suggests that the organizationally-defined
groupings strike a useful balance between informativeness and parsimony. When I
applied the popular Girvan-Newman community detection algorithm (Girvan and
Newman 2002) to the full network without any prior information on family mem-
bership, the results suggested that the most purely informative possible clustering
of nodes—i.e., the one that best describes the community structure by maximizing
the resulting modularity—would contain 33 clusters with a modularity of Q = .64.
Notably, the modularity is larger than when groups are defined by organizational
boundaries, but not dramatically so—in fact, the organizationally-defined network
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comes surprisingly close to also providing a maximally informative description of the
relationships therein. The 33 clusters add some granularity, but at the expense of
less parsimony than the 24 organizationally defined groups. Notably, the 33 clusters
include 13 with five or fewer members, groupings that would be of limited interest
for an analysis of interconnection across network boundaries.
2.5 Kinship Bridges
In a thorough analysis of Al Capone’s organized crime network, Smith and Papachris-
tos (2016) suggest one possible mechanism explaining integration across network
boundaries—multiplexity, defined as the existence of multiple relationships between
the same pair of actors (e.g. a business relationship as well as a kinship tie). In
the Capone-centric world of Chicago organized crime, the overlap across criminal,
personal, business, and political networks provided a kind of structural glue for in-
tegrating otherwise disparate social spheres.
Previous qualitative evidence suggests that direct linkages between mafia families
sometimes emerged through intermarriage (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972). While the
historical record does not particularly impress one with the frequency of such ties, a
few salient cases certainly stand out. In particular, historical accounts often reference
Detroit mafiosi Joseph Zerilli and William Tocco, who together formed part of the
city’s ruling mafia council (known by contemporary law enforcement as the “Detroit
Partnership”). Briefly, Tocco married Zerilli’s daughter and had a daughter of his
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own who married the son of Los Angeles boss Nicholas Licata. Zerilli had a son who
married the daughter of Brooklyn boss Joseph Profaci. Together, Tocco and Zerilli
lay at the center of an elite kinship network that stretched from coast to coast (U.S.
Senate 1963).
If the fictive “families” of mafia organization were, at their core, built upon net-
works of actual kinship, to what extent might the network linking these families
together reflect patterns of intermarriage across groups? To what extent might the
mob families of the mid-20th century United States have resembled the economic
and political elites of Renaissance Florence (Padgett and Ansell 1993), for example,
strategically partnering themselves and their children in order to establish gainful
connections and access greater power, information, and resources? Figure 2.4 takes
the full mafia network and peels away all but the ties of criminal association that
occurred between mafiosi who were also linked by kinship—including both blood
and intermarriage. The first pattern to note is that the kin-only subnetwork features
just 13 percent of the mafiosi and 9 percent of the criminal asociation ties in the
original network. Second, while kinship connections sometimes cross organizational
boundaries, they seemingly operated more commonly as a basis for the consolida-
tion of influence within organizations. In total, kinship accounts for just 6 percent
of the bridging ties between organizations, leaving a great deal of room for other
explanatory mechanisms.
In short, multiplexity in the form of kinship ties overlapping with ties of criminal
collaboration is unlikely to scale up enough to account for cross-family and inter-city
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integration in the mid-20th century mafia network analyzed here. Since multiplex
ties by definition feature multiple layers of social connection, they also tend to be
embedded strong ties and are hence unlikely to bridge large social and geographic
distances (Granovetter 1973). Yet, unlike the earlier Prohibition-era organized crime
networks managed by Capone and others, what made the later American Mafia
precisely so fascinating to scholars, policymakers, and the public alike is that it
appeared to be much more than local in scope—instead bearing the trademarks of a
well-organized national or even international conspiracy.
2.6 Division of Network Labor
What might explain the co-existence of high local clustering with significant bridging
ties between otherwise clearly separated mafia groups? One explanation would be
that most mafiosi in the network maintained a balance of within-family and between-
family ties. A different explanation would be that there emerged a division of network
labor in which relatively few mafiosi maintained most of the key bridges generating
network integration and structural efficiency. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of
the number of bridging (extra-family) network ties maintained by each mafioso and
clearly suggests evidence for the second explanation. In fact, 32 percent of mafiosi
had zero ties outside their own family and another 19 percent had just one. Yet,
a smaller number of mafiosi acted as key brokers maintaining many extra-family
ties. This skewness is not a mere reflection of differences in network degree, either;
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Figure 2.4: Kinship ties in the mafia network
Note: Nodes are colored according to family membership.
a similar distribution appeared when I instead looked at the proportion of bridging
ties in each mafioso’s egocentric network.
The natural next question is to whom the distinctive role of network bridge was
most likely to fall. A long literature associates the occupancy of bridging positions
in network structure with personal influence, access to diverse information and re-
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of bridging ties in egocentric networks
sources, and higher social status (Burt 1992, 2004; Emerson 1962; Fernandez and
Gould 1994; Marsden 1983; Stovel and Shaw 2012). Yet the bridge-status associ-
ation is also seen as conditional and dependent on group context, with actors who
occupy boundary-spanning network positions at risk of being perceived as duplicitous
or untrustworthy in contexts where collectivism and group solidarity are paramount
(Xiao and Tsui 2007).
To observe the bridge-status association in the mafia network, I leverage a unique
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feature of the data set—the directed nominations of criminal associates contained in
each mafioso’s criminal profile. Since each profile is limited in space, the number of
criminal associates that can be listed in a given profile is also limited. Consequently,
the investigators who constructed the dossier tended to prioritize better-known as-
sociates. Thus, a high-ranking mafia leader is more likely to appear in a lower-level
mafioso’s list of criminal associates than the reverse, allowing us to exploit the di-
rected nominations for leverage in measuring status and centrality in the mafia orga-
nization (Mastrobuoni and Patacchini 2012). Using this directed network, I measure
each mafioso’s centrality using pagerank (Page et al. 1999). The pagerank measure
is a variant of eigenvector centrality and is best known as the method through which
Google ranks search results. Just as the highest-scoring web pages are those that are
linked to by many and higher-ranked other pages, the highest-scoring criminals in
the data set are those that receive nominations from many and higher-ranked other
criminals.
I was able to confirm the face validity of the constructed measure by comparison
with extant archival evidence on formal rank in the family hierarchy. Using avail-
able organizational charts for nine families from U.S. Senate (1963), I classified 196
individuals according to three broad classes of mafia rank: leaders (bosses, former
bosses, acting bosses, etc.; N = 19), lieutenants (N = 43), and soldiers (N = 134).
A valid network-based rank measure should identify clear differences among these
three classes corresponding to differences in actual rank within the family. It does—
subtracting the average rank within each family to create an adjusted measure, I
find that soldiers average about .00 (the value is not negative because soldiers are
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compared to lower-level associates trying to gain entrance to the family ranks), lieu-
tenants average about .02, and leaders average about .06. The value for lieutenants
is right around the 75th percentile in the sample of 196 people while the value for
leaders is much higher. For robustness, I also look at both in-degree (number of
incoming nominations) and betweenness (number of geodesics or shortest paths on
which the focal node lies) as alternative measures of individual rank.
To make the analysis more meaningful, I generate family-specific centrality scores
that only consider the network of ties among members of each family. This approach
is needed because we want to see how the role of inter-organizational broker is dis-
tributed within the hierarchy of individual families.6 In order to adjust for overall
differences in the connectedness of different families, each mafioso’s centrality score
is centered by subtracting the family mean. Figure 2.6 displays nonparametric local
polynomial fits of the relationship between the three adjusted measures of network
centrality and the proportion of bridging ties in each mafioso’s egocentric network.
Interestingly, the results suggest a roughly U-shaped association between bridging
and status, meaning that the mafiosi with networks built around bridging ties tended
to be those with either relatively low or high status within their family of affiliation,
but not those of relatively middling status.
Substantively, these patterns suggest a dynamic akin to what Phillips and Zuck-
6Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012) similarly rely heavily on measures of network centrality in
their analysis of the mafia network. The key difference is that they measure centrality purely in
terms of the global network. While this approach is surely suitable for some purposes, it also very
likely conflates individual-level centrality with group-level attributes such as organizational size and
geographic locale.
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Figure 2.6: Proportion of bridging ties by centrality
Note: Plotted values are based on local polynomial smoothing.
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erman (2001) call middle-status conformity. Lower-status mafiosi can afford to oc-
cupy boundary-spanning bridge positions in the network because—by virtue of their
already-low status—they have relatively little to lose from the approbation of peers
who might view their boundary-spanning activity with suspicion. Conversely, high-
status mafiosi can engage in boundary-spanning activity because their high status
insulates them from the judgment of lower-ranked peers. This dynamic will become
the main subject of Chapter 3.
2.7 Summary and Discussion
Network scholars have long argued that criminal and covert organizations are biased
toward decentralized, less discoverable—and thereby more secure—structures at the
expense of the diverse, cross-cutting relationships that classically make communi-
cation and coordination across network space more efficient (Baker and Faulkner
1993; Erickson 1981; Morselli et al. 2007). While previous work has illustrated this
argument within the context of particular criminal organizations or conspiratorial
incidents, the present chapter extended it to the analysis of a larger-scale national
criminal network spanning more than 700 members of 24 distinct American mafia
families operating in the mid-20th century. There are limitations to the analysis
taken up here. For example, the focus on ties of criminal association is in some ways
too broad and in others too narrow—too broad in the sense of missing the precise
behavioral content of individual connections and yet too narrow in the sense of miss-
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ing the richer matrix of political, social, and economic ties within which organized
crime is embedded (Papachristos and Smith 2014). Despite these limitations, two
key sets of findings have emerged from the analysis.
First, I showed—using Newman and Girvan’s (2004) concept of modularity—
that the American mafia network was dominated by intragroup ties that gave rise to
dense networks of criminal association within particular organizations or “families.”
While organizational boundaries were lower in the case of New York City, where
five families operated in the same urban area, I still found that intragroup ties
appeared with far greater regularity than one would expect by chance. Nonetheless,
the national network featured substantial integration across organizational clusters
such that a mafioso in Providence or New York could typically reach one in San
Francisco or Los Angeles through just a few degrees of separation. By comparing
the observed structure with randomly “rewired” networks of the same size, I showed
that the American Mafia was an example of a small-world structure featuring both
high local clustering and low average path lengths (Watts and Strogatz 1998). These
small-world properties point toward a balance in network structure that allowed for
both high security—by virtue of dense local clusters with relatively few outgoing
connections—and high efficiency—due to bridging ties that greatly increased each
criminal’s reachability from any other.
Second, in attempting to shed light on the mechanisms that gave rise to this
structure, I demonstrated evidence for a division of network labor in which a rela-
tively small number of actors occupied the bulk of the bridging connections giving
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rise to network integration. Rather than broadly dispersed, occupancy of inter-
organizational network bridges was heavily concentrated among a minority of net-
work members. Furthermore, by applying several measures of status centrality within
families, I found suggestive evidence for a dynamic of middle-status conformity
(Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) in which bridging ties were most prevalent in the
networks of either low- or high-status—but not middle-status—criminals. The next
chapter will seek to go beyond this description of the network structure by exam-
ining more closely how patterns of brokerage and closure arose out of mechanisms




In the preceding chapter, we saw through a reconstruction of the historical net-
work linking together 24 mafia families across the United States that the American
Mafia is best seen as a version of a small-world network combining high localism and
closure with extensive integration across geographic and organizational boundaries.
We also saw that this balanced structure reflected a division of network labor in
which a small minority of actors disproportionately accounted for the bridging ties
linking together disparate families. Moving beyond the analysis of whole network
structures, the focus of this chapter is to account for this division of network labor
in more detail through analysis of the individual-level correlates of brokerage. As
discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2, the mafia family represents a classic case of
a closed organization with a heavy emphasis on loyalty and undivided commitment.
At the level of the individual mafioso, then, why and how would one take up the task
of brokerage across family boundaries? And at the level of the mafia family, how
does the organization balance the need to access diverse valued resources against the
risk of diluting the loyalties and identities of its members?
To move toward an effective answer to these questions requires engaging with
broader theories of network position and social capital. Network scholars have long
seen brokerage—defined as the occupancy of bridging positions between otherwise
unconnected people and groups in network structure—as a wellspring of social cap-
ital. By virtue of having access to multiple overlapping social circles, brokers are
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more likely to be exposed to novel information and to see potential opportunities that
would be missed by peers entrenched within comparatively insular network arrange-
ments (Burt 1992, 2004; Granovetter 1973). In organizational contexts, occupancy
of brokerage positions is associated with greater likelihood of promotion, higher rates
of innovation and creativity, better compensation, and even the discovery of “good
ideas” (e.g. Brass 1984; Burt 1992, 1997, 2004; Fleming et al. 2007; Kleinbaum
2012). More broadly, brokerage has been shown to be a precursor of power, status,
and influence across an impressive array of domains, from organizational networks
in the healthcare policy field (Fernandez and Gould 1994) and political competi-
tion among rival families in Renaissance Florence (Padgett and Ansell 1993) to elite
political mobilization in both America and England (Hillmann 2008a,b) and even
virtual achievement in a massively multiplayer video game (Burt 2012). In short,
as Kleinbaum (2012) summarizes: “If the social networks literature has taught us
anything, it is that brokers do better” (p. 407).
Yet, other empirical studies suggest that the individual returns to brokerage are
contextually specific. In cultural and organizational contexts where group solidarity
and cohesion are heavily valued, individuals who occupy boundary-spanning broker-
age positions may be viewed with suspicion rather than rewarded for their diversity
of interests (Podolny and Baron 1997; Stovel and Shaw 2012). Whereas Burt (1992)
famously argues that managers accrue social capital by spanning “structural holes”
between otherwise disconnected alters, Xiao and Tsui (2007) find that similar out-
comes fail to materialize in Chinese firms where commitment and loyalty to the group
are paramount. Explaining this discrepancy, they argue that social capital is cultur-
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ally contingent: within the collectivistic culture of the Chinese firm, brokers are seen
as deviant and disloyal rather than enterprising and entrepreneurial (though see Nee
et al. 2017).
While attending to heterogeneity in the benefits of brokerage across cultural and
organizational contexts, however, comparatively little attention has been given to
heterogeneity within such domains. This is surprising given extant evidence that—
even in contexts where informal networks are almost entirely organized around
parochial in-group ties—the complete absence of bridging connections is rare. As
previously discussed, for example, small-world network theory observes that even
networks dominated by local closure generally feature enough cross-cutting connec-
tions that any two actors are likely to be tied through just a few intermediary links,
famously captured in the notion of “six degrees of separation” (Watts and Strogatz
1998; Watts 1999). But when social groups demand unfettered commitment and
suspect dilettantes, what kinds of actors make the wide-ranging connections neces-
sary to bridge the parochial divide? After all, any potential broker might risk her
standing within her own group by transparently pursuing brokerage between groups.
This puzzle suggests the need for greater investigation of how variation in the net-
work positions occupied by different actors in the same cultural and organizational
context corresponds to heterogeneity in the individual returns from brokerage.
Addressing this puzzle, I argue that a division of network labor within parochial
organizations emerges specifically as an unintended consequence of organizational at-
tempts to control and regulate membership. High-commitment organizations often
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implement rules of institutional closure limiting access to group-controlled resources
to actors who meet specific standards of membership and have proven themselves
sufficiently loyal (e.g. Coser 1974). These rules have the additional effect of encourag-
ing members to build their informal networks in ways that deepen their attachment
to the group and their access to parochial social capital, conversely discouraging
brokerage activity that might create the appearance of duplicitous motivations. In
such contexts, I argue that the actors most likely to occupy brokerage positions
are those who can afford the potential damage to their image—either because their
already-secure status within the group insulates them from judgment or because
their outsider status leaves them with little to lose in the first place (Phillips and
Zuckerman 2001).
For the second category of “outsider brokers,” furthermore, occupancy of bro-
kerage positions provides a path to obtaining greater influence and status within a
closed group. Yet, this pathway to influence also depends critically on the absence of
a market for brokerage among more well-connected insiders. Unless brokerage activ-
ity is discouraged for insiders, in other words, outsiders will remain at a structural
disadvantage because they represent a necessarily indirect network connection into
the organization. Taken together, this argument reveals a seldom-noted paradox of
social organization: By ensuring a robust demand for brokerage while simultaneously
ensuring that few insiders will emerge to fill this demand, organizational attempts at
institutional closure can have the unintended consequence of empowering outsiders to
form wide-ranging connections that undermine the very boundaries those attempts
at closure are designed to protect.
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By way of preview, I find that the occupancy of brokerage positions between
mafia families was generally a status liability rather than a benefit. More interesting
are the exceptions to this rule. First, I show that brokerage positions between fami-
lies were disproportionately likely to be occupied by either high-status criminal elites
or by non-Italian ethnic outsiders who were specifically barred from membership in
any family. Second, I demonstrate that, for these ethnic outsiders, brokerage be-
tween families was associated with higher status within families. Third, a multilevel
analysis suggests that the status correlates of brokerage also depended on the degree
of organizational closure in a given family. Yet, this interaction worked in opposite
directions for elite Italian criminals and for ethnic outsiders. For the former, broker-
age was correlated with status in mafia organizations with open network structures,
where occupancy of brokerage positions might be seen as more normatively accept-
able. In contrast, ethnic outsiders saw a positive correlation between brokerage and
status especially in organizations with closed network structures, since the absence
of bridging ties held by better-connected Italian criminals made non-Italians more
likely to hold exclusive access to potentially valuable connections in other organi-
zations. Finally, I show that this pattern extends even beyond the hard distinction
between Italian “insiders” and non-Italian “outsiders”—for lower-status Italian crim-
inals, too, brokerage between mafia families was more likely to be a status benefit
rather than a liability.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the
two dominant mechanisms through which network structure has been thought to
produce social capital—brokerage and closure. Building on this literature, I then
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present the main theoretical argument: that institutional closure gives rise to a divi-
sion of network labor with heterogeneous rewards associated with the occupancy of
brokerage positions. After describing some illustrative network examples, I present
multivariate analyses that document three key patterns: (1) heterogeneity in the oc-
cupancy of brokerage positions in the inter-organizational network, (2) corresponding
heterogeneity in the relationship between inter-organizational brokerage and intra-
organizational status, and (3) further variation in this relationship across organi-
zations with open and closed network structures. I conclude by summarizing the
chapter and discussing some limitations of the analysis.
3.1 Network Structure and Social Capital
Scholars have classically seen the relationship between network structure and social
capital as emerging through two mechanisms: brokerage and closure. Arguments for
brokerage begin from the observation that network ties—relationships connecting ac-
tors in social space—have distinct capabilities connected most critically to the length
or “range” of the tie. Granovetter (1973) famously argues that longer-range “weak”
ties—those spanning greater distances in the network—bear more novel information
than shorter-range “strong” ties embedded in dense local clusters.1 Since actors em-
bedded in the same local networks tend to share many overlapping affiliations, they
1If the idea of network distance is not intuitive, simply consider what would happen if one were
to erase the tie between two actors A and B—would it then be easy or difficult to trace an additional
path between the two actors? If there is an additional short path (e.g. through a third actor C
who is connected to both A and B), then we can say that the network distance between A and B
is low.
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also tend to hear many of the same things and receive much of the same redundant
information.2
Subsequent work, most notably Burt’s (1992) theory of “structural holes,” ex-
tends this principle to analyze sources of individual advantage in network structure.
An actor occupies a structural hole when she bridges between two otherwise un-
connected actors in the network. In line with a focus on networks as instrumental
structures for the acquisition of desired resources, A’s occupancy of a structural hole
between B and C implies that a potential transaction between the latter two actors
could be brokered by A. Accordingly, A has the advantage of what Simmel called
the tertius gaudens (“the rejoicing third”) who can play B and C off of one another
for her own benefit. When examining network structures derived from surveys and
other sociometric instruments meant to uncover a broadly defined set of relationships
among actors, brokerage often refers not to any specific instance of mediation but
rather more broadly to the occupancy of network positions that provide the oppor-
tunity for such mediation in a network of ongoing informal relationships. In such
cases, we use the term brokerage as a shorthand for “potential brokerage” (Fernandez
and Gould 1994). Network positions associated with high potential brokerage have
in turn been seen as a major correlate of personal advantage, yielding access and
control over flows of resources and information (Boissevain 1974; Brass 1984; Burt
1992, 1997, 2004; Emerson 1962; Fernandez and Gould 1994; Fleming et al. 2007;
2As pointed out by Aral and Van Alstyne (2011), however, longer range ties may bear a higher
rate of novel information per interaction but still less overall novel information due to the lower
bandwidth (e.g. lower frequency or duration of interaction) of these ties.
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Kleinbaum 2012; Marsden 1983; Stovel and Shaw 2012).3
The robust counterargument for network closure as the key to social capital is
rooted in Coleman’s (1988) emphasis on the dense, redundant webs of affiliation
that bind individuals to groups and give rise to social cohesion and trust. Whereas
boundary-spanning bridge ties lower opportunity costs by easing access to novel infor-
mation and resources held by more socially distant actors or groups, local network
closure lowers transaction costs by enabling groups to exercise greater normative
control over their members (Coleman 1988; Greif 2006; Nee and Opper 2012; Peng
2004; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). In the simplest such scenario, consider a
closed triad in which actors A, B, and C are each connected to one another. While
none of the three enjoy any potential advantage as brokers—no actor can take ad-
vantage of an absent tie between any two others—A and B are more likely to be able
to influence C ’s behavior through a combination of mutual monitoring, information
sharing, and joint pressure. The monitoring capacity present in networks full of such
closed triads—hence made up of dense webs of overlapping social relationships—
enable what Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) term enforceable trust, meaning that
conformity with group expectations is more easily monitored and deviance from
these same expectations more expediently discovered and punished. Echoing this
3Yet, as Buskens and van de Rijt (2008) elegantly highlight, the fact that the returns to brokerage
decrease with the number of actors capable of performing it means that the incentives for brokerage
are also dynamic and density-dependent. Reagans and Zuckerman (2008) highlight another tradeoff:
if the “bits” of information and resources stored in different groups are nonsubstitutable, then the
non-redundancy of the broker’s network undermines her power as an acquirer of resources even as
it empowers her as a provider of resources. The reason is simple: while ego’s network diversity
ensures that ego’s alters will have few alternative sources for the resources controlled by ego, it also
implies that ego will have few alternative sources for the resources controlled by her alters, since
having such alternatives would presumably require redundant ties.
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line of thinking and applying it to advancement within an organizational environ-
ment, Podolny and Baron (1997) argue that brokerage may fail to yield benefits to
the extent that the broker is seen as violating clear and consistent role expectations
associated with one’s position in the organization. “A clear social identity,” they
write, “is facilitated by smaller networks that display high closure and cohesiveness,
not large networks full of structural holes” (p. 674).4
The identity of the broker, and not just the cultural or organizational environ-
ment, also matters. This is especially evident in research on coalition building in
networks of political actors, where successful brokerage depends not just on spanning
diverse groups in network structure but also on the broker’s ability to make use of
this structural alignment. Illustrating the complexity of these dynamics, Fernandez
and Gould (1994) find that organizational brokers who operate as “representatives”
from within a policy cluster capitalize on brokerage by taking public stands on events,
whereas “outsider brokers” must remain neutral in order to convert network position
into policy influence. Examining coalition building as a precursor to mobilization
in the English Civil War, Hillmann (2008b) finds that effective political brokerage
belonged to actors with a particular identity—new merchant elites with business
interests in the American colonies could draw on their embeddedness in multiple
networks to mediate between diverse elite interests. Common to these empirical set-
4Yet, contrasting brokerage and closure as mechanisms need not always imply an antagonistic
relationship. For example, Burt (2000) frames brokerage through structural holes as a source of
“value added” and accompanying structures of closure as enabling the realization of that added
value. While not explicitly using network terminology, Putnam (2000) distinguishes between local
“bonding” capital and between-group “bridging” capital. The focus of the present analysis on
bridging ties between otherwise closed and cohesive groups is consistent with these accounts.
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tings is the existence of disjoint groups that could nonetheless benefit collectively
from cooperation. Clearly, this is not always the case, as when cosmopolitan brokers
bridging larger distances in social space undermine and thereby threaten the power
enjoyed by local brokers (Hillmann 2008a).
To pull these different threads together: A longstanding literature suggests that
brokerage is a key source of social capital, but that the ability to translate brokerage
into individual advantage is also contextually dependent. In organizations where
commitment and loyalty are prized, brokerage can become a liability and even be
seen as a form of deviance. What this discussion misses, however, is that the bene-
fits of brokerage might be just as heterogeneous within organizational and cultural
contexts as across such contexts. This is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that
most networks feature a balance between brokerage and closure, with the task of
brokerage often falling to a relatively small number of motivated actors. A largely
separate literature on political brokerage argues that the identity of the broker mat-
ters when attempting to mediate between groups with divergent identities. However,
the historical case studies comprising this literature generally focus on contexts in
which groups with divergent identities nonetheless have a clear collective interest in
collaboration. In many other contexts, however, individual actors pursue brokerage
outside the bounds of group control, forming bridging ties that may serve—but just
as likely undermine—collective interests. For example, Erikson and Bearman (2006)
document the privateering activities of English East India Company ship captains
who sailed port-to-port to form a network of malfeasant private trading despite the
narrowly prescribed trade routes imposed by their superiors. This deviant activity
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was brokerage in the classic sense of weaving new connections between distant ac-
tors (i.e. traders in port cities) in order to facilitate the flow of resources across
gaps in social structure (Stovel and Shaw 2012). Yet, this private brokerage came at
substantial financial cost to the East India Company itself.5
Bridging these debates, this chapter asks: what kinds of actors take up the task
of brokerage in contexts where brokerage activity itself is seen as a form of deviance?
Even if a relatively small number of brokers is sufficient to integrate actors from
disparate groups, in other words, who might become a broker given the risk of ex-
clusion and perceived duplicity among one’s colleagues? And do such actors pursue
brokerage as part of or merely in spite of their attempts to increase their status and
legitimacy in the eyes of others—and thus their access to social capital?
3.2 Brokerage from Institutional Closure
A century ago, Simmel described a ubiquitous social type: the “stranger” whose role
in the group is defined “by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that
he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it” (Simmel
1971, p. 143). Due to this outsider status, Simmel also posited that the stranger
involved in economic activity would always appear as the sojourning trader—in effect,
a broker—lacking permanent roots (i.e. landed property) in any one locale. Rather
than viewing the pursuit of brokerage as a strategic game played among insiders,
5As Erikson and Bearman (2006) also note, however, the resulting framework of a more globally
integrated trade network was later exploited to the company’s benefit.
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Simmel’s account suggested that brokerage can instead be a residual function left to
marginal actors with few alternatives. Yet, it can hardly be said that marginal status
guarantees a capability or aptitude for brokerage. In many cases, marginal actors
left out of dominant institutional arrangements are instead relegated to clientelistic
positions in which their access to resources depends solely on patronage from better-
connected insiders.
Furthermore: How do outsiders become outsiders in the first place? This difficulty
can be skirted over when network structure is presented as an a priori given inde-
pendent variable, or if brokers are retroactively defined as outsiders because they are
positioned at the interstices of multiple groups. However, patterns of relations often
emerge through individual agency and are shaped by the incentives associated with
the occupancy of different network positions. While the migrant trader described by
Simmel played a brokerage function in much the same way as the corporate mover-
and-shaker chronicled by Burt (1992), for example, the forces that lead each to this
role differ dramatically. Whereas the corporate broker inhabits the role by playing
the strategic game of the insider, the migrant trader becomes broker because he or
she has few other options. Yet, attention to heterogeneity in the mechanisms that
shape network position often falls casualty to an emphasis on networks as causal
forces unto themselves. One key to explaining such heterogeneity is to focus not
just on patterns of relations but also on institutional features—rules and norms—of
social groups (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Nee and
Ingram 1998; Powell et al. 2005). After all, network structure reflects and aggre-
gates the rules, norms, meanings, and incentives guiding behavior, which are in turn
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heterogeneous across social positions and categories.
In the discussion of theoretical mechanisms in Chapter 1, I suggested that the
network positions available to different actors in a particular context could be ex-
plained by corresponding patterns of institutional closure, defined in terms of the
rules and norms that distinguish insiders from outsiders in particular institutional
and organizational contexts. Chapter 2 provided some suggestive evidence for this
explanation when we saw that the relationship between occupancy of bridging ties
between mafia families and status within one’s own family was U-shaped—bridging
ties were predominantly held by either the lowest- or highest-status actors, but not
those of middling status. This pattern makes sense in light of theories of “middle-
status conformity.” When avoiding brokerage is a norm of conformity to group
expectations, the highest-status insiders can deviate for the simple reason stated by
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001): “Since high-status actors feel confident in their social
acceptance, they are emboldened to deviate from conventional behavior” (p. 380).
In contrast, conformity will be highest among “actors who value their membership in
a group yet feel insecure in that membership” (ibid.). However, the motivations and
consequences behind brokerage are likely to differ in the cases of the unconditional
outsider and the well-connected insider. The high-status insider might maintain
bridging ties simply because her status within the group affords greater freedom
from the potential reprobation of peers. Insider brokerage could also arise inciden-
tally, since actors who are well connected in general will also tend by chance to have
more bridging ties. For the outsider, in contrast, brokerage provides a potential path
to higher status within the group. By controlling key bridges, the outsider can fa-
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cilitate transactions that group members may not be equipped to pursue themselves
for fear of appearing uncommitted.
Yet, another wrinkle in this argument emerges from the interaction between in-
stitutional and network closure, where the latter is defined as the absence of bridging
ties between groups. Even when group members are rewarded for loyalty and un-
divided commitment rather than diversity of connections, the incentives for insiders
to stay within the group’s boundaries implicitly depend on others doing the same.
If all insiders engage in frequent exchange outside the group’s boundaries, no one
individual can be pinpointed as disloyal and thereby suspect. As in other cases of
“deviant” activity, this allows for strength in numbers. In such situations where
the group’s network boundaries become fuzzy and permeable, outsiders are poten-
tially disadvantageous brokers because they provide a less direct route of access than
well-connected insiders who are willing to engage directly with non-members. The
advantage of outsiders as brokers thus depends especially on the relative exclusivity
of their brokerage ties, or the absence of a market for brokerage among generally
better-connected insiders.
In sum, the common intuition holds that the more closed the group, the greater
the returns to insider status. However, the flip side is that the same closure mech-
anism also potentially increases the returns to outsider brokerage by ensuring the
exclusivity of the brokerage ties maintained by those outsiders. The main theoret-
ical expectations for subsequent analysis can be summarized in three propositions:
(a) that brokerage positions spanning boundaries between high-commitment groups
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should be especially likely to be occupied by either higher-status insiders or by ex-
cluded outsiders; (b) that of these two classes of brokers, only outsiders will see a
correlation between brokerage and higher status within a closed group; and (c) that
these outsider brokers will see a larger correlation between brokerage and status in
groups featuring high overall levels of network closure, whereas insider brokers might
see a positive correlation between brokerage and status in groups featuring low levels
of network closure.
3.3 Ethnic Outsiders and Interfamily Exchange
Ethnic non-Italians, though few in number in the mafia network (I record 24 in to-
tal, or roughly 3.4 percent), provide a useful “test case” for illustrating the tendency
for brokerage to be disproportionately concentrated among relative outsiders. As I
will later show, furthermore, it is a test case that usefully generalizes to the broader
population of mafiosi. For the Italian criminal, membership in a mafia family was ex-
clusive and permanent. Thus, we can think of Italian mafiosi as conditional outsiders
who could not belong to any family but their own. The restriction of membership in
any family to ethnic Italians made non-Italians unconditional outsiders who could
not belong—at least in the sense of official membership—to any family.6 The exclu-
sivity and greediness of family membership made the typical Italian member unlikely
to pursue brokerage between families, but paradoxically empowered non-Italian as-
6Formally, members are distinguished from non-members by whether or not one has undergone
an initiation ritual that has varied somewhat—while maintaining a common core—in different times
and places (Gambetta 1993 describes both the core elements and variations in great detail).
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sociates to operate at the margins of multiple groups, forging criminal connections
that increased interfamily connectivity.
Since membership loyalties were only exclusive among Italian mafia families, the
Italian mafioso could conduct business with non-Italian associates without seeming
to have duplicitous family loyalties. Interethnic exchange furthermore featured less
risk of costly conflict. Since mafias and other extra-legal “honor cultures” commonly
entail collective responsibility for the defense of group members, individual disputes
can give rise to long chains of reciprocated violence that draw third-party observers
into the melee (Gould 2000; Papachristos 2009). If wronged by a non-Italian asso-
ciate, however, the Italian mafioso could make solidaristic appeals to other members
of his own group without provoking a rival Italian outfit. Relatedly, while schol-
ars generally assume that the mafioso can use the threat of violence to encourage
compliance with terms of exchange, this is only strictly true of exchanges between
mafiosi and civilians. To inflict violence on a member of another family without per-
mission from the boss of that family would be an extremely unusual breach of mafia
rules (Abadinsky 1983). However, prohibitions against violence toward non-member
associates were less stringent. By transacting through non-Italian intermediaries, in
other words, the Italian mafioso regained his ability to use the threat of violence as
a regulatory mechanism to enforce compliance with terms of exchange.
Viewed from the other side, the incentives for non-Italians to act as bridges
between families were deceptively simple. According to the narrative of “ethnic suc-
cession” in American organized crime (Bell 1953; but see Lupsha 1981), American-
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Italian mafiosi were inheritors of a criminal underworld previously dominated by
Jewish and Irish-American gangs (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni 1972). Echoing a classic
theme from Merton’s (1938) analysis of crime and its socioeconomic functions, Bell
characterized the urban rackets as “one of the queer ladders of social mobility in
American life” (1953, p. 133). As Jewish and Irish immigrants gradually found
increasing non-criminal opportunities for economic and social advancement, accord-
ing to this narrative, slower-rising Italian immigrants became the dominant force in
American organized crime. This transition was marked symbolically by the rise of Si-
cilian immigrant Salvatore Lucania—better known as Lucky Luciano—to a position
atop the New York underworld previously held by Jewish beer baron Dutch Schultz
(Abadinsky 1981). In subsequent decades, non-Italian organized crime withered in
American cities. While Jewish and Irish criminals retained a limited presence, they
became independent operators—and usually associates of American-Italian mafia
families—rather than members of their own mafia-like ethnic enterprises. Lacking
membership in any particular family, the non-Italian criminal was unlikely to occupy
a central position within any one cluster of Italian criminals. This left the role of
broker between families as an alternative path to increasing one’s perceived power,
status, and importance in the world of Italian-dominated organized crime.
While the non-Italian criminal’s lack of membership in any family freed him to
pursue brokerage between families as an alternative path to status, however, this
does not necessarily mean that Italian criminals would have entrusted their bridging
capital to ethnic outsiders. In fact, I expect that they would only do so if the
network boundaries between families were particularly high. The reasoning behind
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this expectation is straightforward. If network boundaries were low—suggesting the
absence of a norm against brokerage—Italian criminals at various levels of the status
hierarchy would be more willing to pursue brokerage between families. If one wanted
to gain the most direct and valuable network access to another family, then, the most
expedient route would be to make a connection with an Italian insider (preferably
a well-connected one) of that family rather than taking the more circuitous route of
going through a non-Italian associate.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that while all non-Italians involved in mafia
business were, by rule, non-member associates, the large majority of associates were
ethnic Italians. Among Italian criminals, however, the role of associate was an entry-
level position that would lead eventually to membership—the status of the made
man—for those who could demonstrate family loyalty, sometimes by carrying out a
contract killing on orders from the boss (Maas 1969). For the non-Italian criminal,
by contrast, made man status would never be obtained; even for the most influential
of these criminals, in other words, the role of associate was a permanent one.
3.4 Illustrative Examples
The most historically familiar case of non-Italian influence in mafia affairs is likely
that of Meyer Lansky, who controlled gambling interests in Havana, Las Vegas,
and elsewhere along with financing drug smuggling in conjunction with prominent
American-Italian mafiosi (Bureau of Narcotics 2007). Lansky’s egocentric network,
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Figure 3.1: Egocentric networks for Meyer Lansky and Giacomo Reina
Note: Nodes are colored according to family and sized by degree in the global network.
plotted visually in Figure 3.1, included ties to nine different American-Italian mafia
families. Lansky had strong base affiliations with both the Genovese family (shown
in light blue) of New York City (including famed boss Francisco Costiglia) and the
Trafficante family of Tampa (darker blue), which shared his financial interest in
Cuban-based gambling businesses. Unlike a typical Italian mafioso, however, Lan-
sky’s network was also built heavily around bridging ties to other groups, including
those in New Orleans (pink) and Chicago (dark brown). Clearly, Lansky is far from
representative. Yet, it bears mention that the quantitative patterns reported later in
this chapter remain strong even if Lansky and similarly exceptional cases are removed
from the data.
To attempt an apples-to-apples comparison, I also match Lansky to an Italian
criminal who shares the same main family of affiliation (in this case, the Genovese
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family) and otherwise appears most similar to Lansky in terms of sociodemographic
background and patterns of legal and illegal activity. In short, this is done by estimat-
ing a logistic regression of non-Italian ethnicity on a rich set of covariates (discussed
in more detail in the context of the statistical analyses presented later in the chapter)
and assigning propensity scores to each mafioso. Then, I match each non-Italian to
the Italian criminal in the same family with the most similar propensity score. Un-
like the typical application of propensity scores, this is not done here for the purpose
of enabling more robust causal inference. Rather, it is used merely for illustrative
and comparative purposes, with the goal of visualizing a given non-Italian criminal’s
network next to that of an otherwise similar Italian criminal.
For Lansky, the matched Italian criminal shown in Figure 3.1 is Genovese family
member Giacomo Reina. The contrast with Lansky is abundantly clear. Reina
has ties only to other mafiosi in the Genovese family. These relationships generally
involve mafiosi of much higher status and connectedness than Reina himself, with
these high-status alters also tending to be tied to one another independently of
Reina. Thus, Reina occupies a traditionally clientelistic position within his own
network, occupying few structural holes and lacking any ability to bridge directly to
mafiosi located in other families (even within New York City).
A second case of historically noteworthy non-Italian influence is that of Los
Angeles-based Meyer “Mickey” Cohen, whose egocentric network is shown visually
in Figure 3.2. In addition to reputedly controlling boxing and bookmaking in the
L.A. area, Cohen had by 1960 been arrested more than 20 times for crimes rang-
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ing from embezzlement and violation of tax laws to suspicion of murder (Bureau of
Narcotics 2007). Like Lansky, Cohen’s network demonstrates a clear primary affil-
iation with other L.A.-based criminals (shown in light green). While Cohen’s tie
with a Cleveland-based mafioso (dark green) is made redundant by an additional
link between this same Cleveland mobster and one of Cohen’s Los Angeles cohorts,
his other bridging ties feature no such redundancies. For example, Cohen could link
Buffalo-based criminals (maroon) to those in Cleveland, or New York-based mafiosi
(Genovese mafioso in light blue) to those in Los Angeles with whom Cohen mainly
affiliated. Cohen’s matched Italian criminal is Alfred Sica, a bookmaker and extor-
tionist who, together with brother Joseph, was a core member of the Los Angeles
family (Bureau of Narcotics 2007). While well-connected within this group, Sica had
only one tie beyond the family’s boundaries; and even this tie—to a member of New
York’s Lucchese family—was made redundant by another mutual connection within
Sica’s web of Los Angeles contacts.
Figure 3.3 depicts the network of Solomon Bloom, a significantly lower-profile and
less historically influential non-Italian mafia associate who nonetheless occupied sig-
nificant brokerage positions in the interfamily network. Bloom was an interstate drug
trafficker based out of Brooklyn (Bureau of Narcotics 2007). Despite an average-sized
network with eight associates, Bloom in his capacity as a trafficker occupied several
key bridges linking prominent Detroit-based mafiosi (purple) with a cross-ethnic drug
trafficking circle in New York City that included other non-Italian associates as well
as Lucchese family mafioso Anthony Vellucci. Bloom’s matched Italian is Nicholas
Martello, a Lucchese-affiliated drug trafficker who operated in East Harlem and the
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Figure 3.2: Egocentric networks for Meyer “Mickey” Cohen and Alfred Sica
Note: Nodes are colored according to family and sized by degree in the global network.
Lower East Side of Manhattan (Bureau of Narcotics 2007). Martello’s network shows
him to be in a classically clientelistic position. His main connections are to much
more influential and well-connected Lucchese members and his two extra-family ties
(to other New York mafiosi in the Gambino and Genovese families) are both redun-
dant within his own network.
3.5 The Five Families of New York City
In the analyses presented below, I will measure brokerage in terms of the individ-
ual mafioso’s occupancy of network bridges between two mafia families located in
different cities. Since nearly all cities featured just one family, there is usually no
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Figure 3.3: Egocentric networks for Solomon Bloom and Nicholas Martello
Note: Nodes are colored according to family and sized by degree in the global network.
distinction between within-city bridging and between-city bridging. The exception
is New York City, which featured five families (Genovese, Lucchese, Bonanno, Gam-
bino, and Profaci). A brief detour here will help us see why the ties connecting these
families together must be treated differently than bridging ties connecting families
in different cities.
First, since many mafia businesses are local (e.g. the protection racket), we
should expect a much higher baseline of network integration among families located
in the same city (Gambetta 1993). Families inhabiting the same locale have both
opportunities and incentives to work together on joint business ventures. For this
conceptual and theoretical reason, we should at least be skeptical of treating within-
New York City cities the same as ties between families in different cities.
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More importantly, the intuition that boundaries would be qualitatively different
among the Five Families finds overwhelming confirmation in the data. I decomposed
the overall network (N = 707) into one that contains only the affiliates of the five New
York City families (N = 390) and another that contains affiliates of the remaining 19
families (N = 317). Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict, respectively, family boundaries for the
non-N.Y.C. and within-N.Y.C. sub-networks by drawing polygons around individuals
with the same family affiliation. For the network of non-N.Y.C. families, the polygons
overlap little and family clusters are easily distinguished from one another. For the
N.Y.C. families, family boundaries are largely indiscernible and the polygons instead
appear “stacked” on top of one another. The corresponding modularity metrics are
Q = .78 for the non-N.Y.C. families and Q = .33 for the N.Y.C. families. Since
modularity gives the fraction of within-family ties net of the expected fraction in a
randomly “rewired” network with the same degree distribution, this difference would
not be explained by disparities in the size or density of the two sub-networks.
As a further robustness check, I simulated 100,000 alternative partitions of the
network such that 5 families are chosen at random to form a “cluster” and the mod-
ularity within the 5-family cluster is compared to the modularity in the remaining
19-family sub-network. The resulting modularity differences were as large as the
observed N.Y.C. – non-N.Y.C. difference in less than one percent of the simulations,
suggesting that the uniqueness of the N.Y.C. – non-N.Y.C. partition is highly robust
to perturbation.
Compared to the baseline strength of family boundaries, then, the relations be-
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Figure 3.4: Family boundaries outside of New York City
Note: Networks are depicted using the Fruchterman-Reingold spring-embedding algorithm. Stacked
polygons are drawn around the borders of each family.
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Figure 3.5: Family boundaries within New York City
Note: Networks are depicted using the Fruchterman-Reingold spring-embedding algorithm. Stacked
polygons are drawn around the borders of each family.
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tween New York City’s Five Families appear to represent a qualitatively different
type of intergroup exchange. The New York families shared turf, had their own lo-
cal commission of bosses separate from the national one, and were accustomed to
interacting with one another within their common geographic niche, often forming
alliances that could persist for decades. Consistent with a long literature in the
social sciences suggesting that prosocial norms of exchange (even in a notoriously
anti-social context such as the mafia) arise from dense and localized relations (e.g.
Baldassarri and Grossman 2013; Macy and Skvoretz 1998; Nee and Opper 2012; Uzzi
1996), we might expect that the New York context furnished opportunities to mon-
itor potential exchange partners with greater granularity and thus featured lower
costs for exchange outside of one’s own family.
As discussed above, I expect that non-Italians acted as network bridges in con-
texts where Italian mafiosi would have otherwise been least likely to have extensive
exchange relations across family boundaries. Among New York City’s Five Families,
with their dense networks of interfamily exchange, this is clearly not the case. And
true to this expectation, I found in additional analyses that non-Italian brokerage
generally did not bridge the N.Y.C. families. Yet, I also found that non-Italians
played a key role in linking the N.Y.C. families to non-N.Y.C. families, effectively
acting as “gatekeepers” (Fernandez and Gould 1994) who could either grant access
to valuable affiliations within the Five Families or connect N.Y.C. mafiosi to contacts
in other parts of the country.
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3.6 Statistical Models of Network Position
This first set of statistical analyses tests the proposition that in high-commitment
organizations—where the pursuit of brokerage violates social norms—brokerage po-
sitions should be disproportionately concentrated at the high and low ends of the
status hierarchy within organizations. This is in line with what Phillips and Zuck-
erman (2001) term middle-status conformity—that high-status actors can deviate
because they have greater insulation from peer judgment and low-status actors can
deviate because they have little to lose. Meanwhile, middle-status actors (in this
case, rank-and-file Italian mafia members) conform to behavioral expectations to
avoid sinking lower in the eyes of peers. The high end of the status hierarchy can
be broadly identified with the most elite ethnic Italian criminals in the network.
Conversely, the low end of the status hierarchy can be broadly identified with ethnic
non-Italian associates, who could never gain full membership in any mafia organiza-
tion. It is notable that little work to date has actually sought to explain what types
of actors sort into brokerage roles, as I attempt here (though see Cornwell 2009 for
a previous study focusing on the health correlates of structural holes). To state the
hypotheses more formally:
H1a: Higher-status Italian criminals are more likely than lower-status Italian
criminals to occupy brokerage positions.
H1b: Non-Italian criminals are more likely than comparable Italian criminals to
occupy brokerage positions.
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To test hypotheses H1a and H1b, I model network bridging as a function of
individual attributes that can be measured from the Bureau dossier. The two key
independent variables are non-Italian ethnicity (N = 24) and attendance at the
1957 national meeting in Apalachin (N = 62). Ethnicity distinguishes categorical
insiders from outsiders, since only ethnic Italians could ever attain full membership
in a mafia family. Apalachin attendance usefully distinguishes higher- from lower-
status Italian criminals. The Apalachin meeting included top-level representatives
from nearly all families (the exceptions are Detroit, St. Louis, and Omaha), usually
the boss of the family and several high-ranking lieutenants. Furthermore, we happen
to have accurate records of who attended because the meeting was raided by law
enforcement, producing many arrests. Attendees are clearly marked in the Bureau
dossier. I also found qualitatively similar results when using measures of formal
position in the family hierarchy, but these measures are only available for a subset
of families.
Since narratives of ethnic succession frame Italian-American mafia families as suc-
cessors to earlier Jewish syndicates (Bell 1953), we might suspect that the non-Italian
criminals in the 1960 network were older than comparable Italians and therefore may
have had more time to accumulate wide-ranging criminal connections. The same ap-
plies to Italian criminals who have had time to attain high rank within the family
hierarchy. I adjust for age to account for both possibilities. I also distinguish im-
migrants from American-born criminals and include an indicator of main affiliation
with one of the five New York City families to account for the distinctness of these
groups compared to others.
88
I further include three dichotomous indicators capturing different patterns of ac-
tivity in legal and illegal enterprises. First, I adjust for whether an individual had any
reported ownership or managerial interests in legitimate businesses. I also include a
similar indicator of whether an individual had any reported non-criminal occupation
or profession. Unlike the ownership of legitimate businesses, which usually reflected a
diversification of interest (Maas 1969), working in a non-criminal job would generally
indicate only partial or low-level involvement in organized crime. Third, I adjust for
whether the individual had a clean arrest record as of 1960; this categorization only
applies to 6 percent of individuals and would help to distinguish pseudo-legitimate
“front men” from other criminals. Due to the unique requirements of the drug trade,
I also adjust for whether an individual had any reported involvement with narcotics.
Finally, I adjust for each individual’s number of reported kinship ties—including
both blood relations and intermarriage—to other mafia members and affiliates.
The favored measure among network analysts for the occupancy of brokerage po-
sitions is Freeman’s (1977) betweenness centrality, measured as the number of times
that a node appears on a “geodesic”—the shortest (most efficient) network path—
between two other nodes. Individuals who lay at the interstices of internally cohesive
groups are expected to occupy many of the geodesics bridging those groups. Since
betweenness centrality does not explicitly incorporate group membership, however,
this approach also assumes part of what we want to problematize—the organiza-
tional boundaries that made families akin to network clusters. While Burt’s (1992)
network constraint is another popular measure of brokerage, it focuses on egocentric
network structure rather than group-bridging and is thus not suited to the present
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analysis.
I employ two measures that account explicitly for network boundaries. For both
measures, I only include bridge ties linking mafia families in different cities (as dis-
cussed in the preceding section). The first measure is simply a count of the number
of bridges—edges that cross family boundaries—occupied by each actor. For the
present case, this measure has the benefit of being both simple and robust, as I found
when re-running the models with alternative metrics. Similar results obtained, for
example, when each bridge is weighted according to the number of geodesics crossing
through it. Bridging ties are, on the whole, relatively rare. The average mafioso has
just 1.06 bridge ties in his network, and 61 percent of mafiosi have none.
For the second measure, I employed Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) “brokerage
scores,” which count the frequency with which some node i is connected to nodes j
and k who are not directly connected to one another. Gould and Fernandez’s overall
brokerage score is found by summing four individual scores (or five in a directed
network) corresponding to different types of brokerage, where the type depends on
the group memberships of i, j, and k. Two of these four scores—those for gate-
keeper/representative brokerage and liaison brokerage—involve brokerage when j
and k are in different groups. To measure brokerage that bridges group boundaries,
I use the sum of these two scores.7 Since I found similar results for both the bridge
count and Gould-Fernandez brokerage score measures, the figures presented in the
7The other two forms of brokerage—coordination within groups and itinerant brokerage—are
interesting in and of themselves but less relevant to the present analysis. I also ran models of gate-
keeper/representative and liaison brokerage separately and found similar results for both, suggesting
that they could be combined for the present analysis.
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main text focus for brevity on the simpler bridge count metric. However, the tabular
results also include models using brokerage scores. Table 3.1 includes brief definitions
and descriptive statistics for each variable in the analysis.8
Since the response variables are count measures, I estimate two-level mixed-effects
overdispersed Poisson models with persons nested within mafia families (Gelman and
Hill 2007).9 In addition to the previously discussed covariates, the models include
random-effects at both the individual and family level. The person-level random-
effects account for overdispersion in the response distribution. The family-level
random-effects adjust for overall between-family differences in the propensity (and
opportunity) for bridging activity and allow us to instead focus on between-individual
comparisons. More formally, I estimate models of the form
λik = exp(αk +
M∑
j=1
βjXij + eik) (3.1)
where αk is an intercept that varies by family k; βj is the coefficient for variable
j; Xij is person i’s value for variable j; and eik captures the residual variance across
persons associated with the same mafia family. All models were estimated using
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and the “MCMCglmm” package in R
(Hadfield 2010). Given the network structure of the data, significance tests based on
standard errors are not appropriate. Following common practice, I rely instead on
network simulation. To this end, I constructed 1,000 randomly “rewired” versions
8There were virtually no missing data on the independent variables and covariates; age and
immigrant status were imputed using hot-deck methods for one individual each.
9I also tested negative binomial specifications and found similar results.
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Table 3.1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean (s.d.)
Person-Level:
Bridges
Number of bridge ties connecting fam-




Number of between-group brokerage
instances using Gould-Fernandez scores
13.09 (62.40)
Non-Italian
Was X ethnically non-Italian? (1 =
Y es, 0 = No)
.03
Apalachin
Did X attend Apalachin meeting? (1 =
Y es, 0 = No)
.09
Age Age in years as of 1960 52.02 (9.90)
Immigrant




Did X have any ownership interests in




Did X have any listed non-criminal oc-




Did X have a clean criminal record?
(1 = Y es, 0 = No)
.06
Drug trade
Was X involved in the drug trade?
(1 = Y es, 0 = No)
.57
Kin ties
Number of other mafiosi with whom X
shared a kinship tie
.58 (1.12)
Degree X ’s egocentric network size 7.92 (6.63)
Family-Level:
New York City family
One of New York City’s Five Families
(1 = Y es, 0 = No)
.21
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of the observed network—preserving the original network’s size and density—and
replicated each regression model for each of these “rewired” networks.
Figure 3.6 plots the main results from successive nested regression models. In
each panel, the observed regression coefficient (transformed and presented as an in-
cident rate ratio) is plotted as a vertical line while the distribution of comparison
coefficients from the 1,000 simulated random networks is plotted as a histogram.
While I do not further discuss the control variables here, full tabular results are pro-
vided in Table 3.2. Panels A and D portray coefficients for the relative occupancy
of bridging positions, respectively, among non-Italians (compared to Italians) and
among Italians who attended the national meeting at Apalachin (compared to Ital-
ians who did not). Both categories of individuals tended to occupy more bridging ties
than their counterparts, although the observed difference for Apalachin attendees is
much stronger than that observed for non-Italians (p < .001 in both cases). These
results support hypotheses H1a and H1b. Panels B and E add the full battery of
control variables to the model, inducing little change in the non-Italian coefficient
but reducing the incident rate ratio for Apalachin attendees from about 4.10 to 3.54.
Starker differences emerge when we control for degree, or total number of network
ties, as shown in panels C and F. Since persons are now compared to others with the
same overall network size, the results can be interpreted in relative rates of bridging.
In other words, a positive coefficient indicates a higher proportion of bridging ties
in a person’s network rather than just a higher number of such ties. The usefulness




















































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Multilevel mixed-effects overdispersed Poisson regressions of network
bridging
Bridge Count Gould-Fernandez Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Italian .88*** 92*** 1.06*** 1.47*** 1.67*** 1.79***
Apalachin 1.41*** 1.26*** .79*** 3.16*** 2.80*** 1.54***
Age .02*** .01* .03*** .01*
Immigrant .12** .21*** .27* .46***
Legitimate business .64*** .48*** 1.49*** 1.01***
Non-criminal occupation .02 .15** .28* .54***
Clean record -.40*** .03 -1.01*** .14
Drug trade .17*** .06 .37*** .14
Kin ties .25*** .07** .63*** .14***
N.Y.C. family -.91** -1.16*** -1.36 -1.73**
Degree .09*** .23***
Intercept -.82 -1.26 -1.56 -1.30 -2.51 -3.13
Residual Variance:
Person-level 1.58 1.47 1.06 11.80 11.01 6.93
Family-level .45 .01 .05 1.23 .00 .04
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Note: N = 707. Untransformed Poisson
regression coefficients are shown. P-values are based on comparison to estimated coefficients in
1,000 randomly permuted versions of the observed network. Age is mean-centered.
around bridging ties from those who simply have many bridging ties by virtue of
having many ties in general.
Interestingly, controlling for degree pushes the coefficients for non-Italian ethnic-
ity and Apalachin attendance in opposite directions. Non-Italian brokerage becomes
more pronounced after accounting for degree (non-Italians in the data set have av-
erage degree of 6.88 compared to the overall mean of 7.92). Degree-adjusted non-
Italians are about 190 percent more likely to occupy an additional network bridge
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than comparable Italians. Meanwhile, Apalachin attendees are about 120 percent
more likely than their peers to occupy an additional network bridge after adjusting
for degree, representing a decrease of about 37 percent compared to the coefficient
in the non-degree-adjusted model. In contrast to non-Italians, who bridge groups
despite lower overall degree, this means that Apalachin attendees bridge groups in
substantial part due to simply being well-connected in general (the average degree
among attendees is about 12.02).
3.7 Statistical Models of Brokerage and Status
The second analysis focuses on distinguishing the consequences of occupying bro-
kerage positions for either high-status insiders or ethnic outsiders. The high-status
insider might maintain bridging ties simply because his or her status within the group
affords greater freedom from the potential reprobation of peers. For the outsider, in
contrast, brokerage provides a potential path to higher status within the group. By
controlling key bridges, the outsider can facilitate transactions that group members
may not be equipped to pursue themselves for fear of appearing uncommitted. More
formally:
H2a: For elite Italian criminals, occupancy of brokerage positions between groups
is not associated with higher status within groups.
H2b: For non-Italian criminals, occupancy of brokerage positions between groups
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is associated with higher status within groups.
To test hypotheses H2a and H2b, I rely on the Google pagerank scores developed
in Chapter 2 again to measure each mafioso’s relative status within the family net-
work. These directed nominations convey useful information on the “pecking order”
as perceived by those who constructed the dossier. For example, while a boss would
usually be listed prominently as a criminal associate of numerous individuals within
his family, a low-level hoodlum in the same family would be very unlikely to appear
in his boss’s list of associates.
Figure 3.7 graphically depicts the results of a multilevel linear mixed-effects model
in which pagerank (logged to reduce skewness) is regressed on the proportion of
bridging ties in each person’s egocentric network. The model includes a quadratic
term for bridging and interaction effects with ethnicity and Apalachin attendance.
All covariates from the previous models are also included. I use the proportion of
bridging ties (controlling for degree) so that the results can be interpreted in terms of
the relative returns to building one’s network around bridging rather than parochial
ties. In line with the hypotheses, the results suggest that bridging ties were an overall
net negative to one’s rank within the family. For non-Italians, however, bridging ties
were a net positive up until a high threshold after which the returns decrease. This
nonlinearity makes intuitive sense and suggests that the highest-ranked non-Italian
broker would be someone who managed to remain embedded within a core family
while also forming key extra-local ties.




















































































































































































































































































































who had high stature within families were better known and therefore more equipped
to become bridges between families. Yet, this narrative is also consistent with the
theoretical argument—why would an Italian criminal of comparable stature be so
much less likely to occupy bridging positions if not for an underlying incentive struc-
ture that favored parochial over bridging social capital? The key to the hypothesis
lies more in the presence of an association than in its causal direction. Perhaps non-
Italians were empowered to the extent that they could provide brokerage. Or, they
may have sorted into brokerage positions more easily to the extent that they were
already powerful. The likeliest answer is that the observed patterns reflect both of
these dynamics. The more important question is whether the occupancy of broker-
age positions was sufficiently associated with status such that brokers would have
plausibly been capable of exercising influence over multiple families and enabling
meaningful coordination across family boundaries.
3.8 Family Closure and Brokerage
The third analysis focuses on the interaction between institutional and network clo-
sure, where the latter is defined as the absence of bridging ties between groups. Even
in high-commitment organizations where members are rewarded for undivided com-
mitment rather than maintaining diverse connections, there can still be strength in
numbers if rank-and-file members frequently engage with others outside the group.
In such contexts, outsiders are unlikely to provide the kind of direct access to key
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resources that one could gain from doing business with a strongly-connected insider
with well-placed bridging ties. The returns to outsider brokerage, in other words,
are predicted to depend especially on the relative absence of brokerage ties among
group members as a whole. More formally:
H3a: For elite Italian criminals, occupancy of brokerage positions is associated
with higher status in families with more open networks.
H3b: For non-Italian criminals, occupancy of brokerage positions is associated
with higher status in families with more closed networks.
To test hypotheses H3a and H3b, I develop a network measure capturing variation
across families in the extent to which members rely predominantly on within-group
rather than between-group ties, in line with the longstanding view that groups can be
defined by the affiliation patterns of their members (Breiger 1974). More technically,
the crux of the measurement strategy lies in a comparison between the empirically
observed network and the counterfactual network we would expect to observe if
network ties were formed purely by chance. The most closed mafia families feature
relatively many more within-group ties than expected given random sorting. More














where members of family k are indexed by i, network alters (in family k and other-
wise) are indexed by j, the family affiliation of node i is denoted as f(i), and network
ties (with values 0 or 1) are denoted by m. Equation 3.2 simply states that the degree
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of observed closure in family k is the proportion of network ties involving any mem-
ber of k that occur within the group. If no group members have any extra-family
bridge ties, Ck = 1; if group members have nothing but bridge ties, Ck = 0.
We expect larger groups to score higher on this closure metric by chance—the
larger the proportion of nodes belonging to family k, the greater the probability that
even a randomly formed network tie would link two nodes i and j who belong to
the same (large) group. However, a measure of group closure should express the
extent of observed closure in group k compared to that we would expect by chance.
Formally,
C∗k = Ck − E(Ck) (3.3)
where the expected level of closure in family k is E(Ck). In order to compute this
expected value, we can compare the edge values in the observed network to those in a
“null configuration” of the same network in which ties are formed randomly but the
degree distribution of the original network is preserved. Following Newman (2006),
we can assume that the expected probability of observing a network tie by random





where di is the network degree of node i and m gives the total number of observed
network ties. E(Ck) is found simply by substituting the null configuration values
Eij for every possible node pair into Equation 3.2. Finally, in order to focus on
deviations from perfect closure (a more natural reference point when average closure
101
is high), I use
Ok = 1− C∗k (3.5)
as a measure of group openness, where low values indicate closure and higher values
denote increasingly open group boundaries.
For this analysis, I re-estimate the model used to generate Figure 3.7 with the
addition of an interaction term between the measure of group openness and the pro-
portion of bridging ties in each person’s network. In addition to all control variables
included in previous models, I also adjust for family size in order to account for the
possibility that smaller families will have greater need for collaboration and thus a
greater proportion of outgoing ties (e.g. Gambetta 1993). Figure 3.8 plots predicted
values from these models for non-Italians while Figure 3.9 plots predicted values
for Apalachin attendees. Both sets of results support theoretical expectations and
suggest striking differences in the way that group structure organizes patterns of
brokerage. For non-Italians, proportion of bridging ties is positively associated with
rank in closed families and negatively associated with rank in open families. For
Apalachin attendees, the opposite pattern holds—bridging is negatively associated
with rank in closed families and positively (though not strongly) associated with
rank in open families.
Given the relatively small number of families, of course, we should be cautious
in interpreting both patterns. At the least, we can say that the results are certainly
consistent with expectations and suggestive of a mechanism to explain the social
organization of brokerage—namely, that network closure creates opportunities for
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Figure 3.8: Bridging, family openness, and status for non-Italians
Note: Points represent fitted values from a multilevel linear mixed-effects model of logged pagerank
on the proportion of bridging ties in each person’s egocentric network interacted with both the family
openness score and ethnicity. Family openness increases along the y-axis while pagerank increases
along the z-axis. The model includes all main effects from Table 3.2 (including degree), as well as
quadratic terms for bridging and openness and an adjustment for family size. All terms not shown
are held constant.
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Figure 3.9: Bridging, family openness, and status for Apalachin attendees
Note: Points represent fitted values from a multilevel linear mixed-effects model of logged pagerank
on the proportion of bridging ties in each person’s egocentric network interacted with both the family
openness score and Apalachin attendance. Family openness increases along the y-axis while pagerank
increases along the z-axis. The model includes all main effects from Table 3.2 (including degree),
as well as quadratic terms for bridging and openness and an adjustment for family size. All terms
not shown are held constant.
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brokerage by outsiders that do not translate for otherwise comparable insiders. Con-
versely, the returns to brokerage by outsiders disappear when insiders are normatively
or practically capable of pursuing brokerage themselves.
3.9 Extending the Argument
To this point, I have based my argument for outsider brokerage around examining
non-Italians as a critical “test case.” Non-Italians present an appropriate test be-
cause of the consistent and visible way in which they were excluded from official
membership in mafia families. Yet, there are limits to this case. Of 707 individuals
in the data, only 24 were non-Italian. While I have shown that these non-Italians
were disproportionately involved in brokerage activities between families, we could
still remove these 24 individuals from the network without dramatically decreasing
the overall integration among families.
As a further test of the outsider brokerage argument, I examine whether the
differences observed between non-Italians and Italians also extend to gradations of
brokerage among Italian criminals of varying status. Again, by conceiving of bro-
kerage as a form of deviance, we might expect to see a pattern of “middle-status
conformity” in which either low- or high-status—but not middle-status—criminals
are most likely to occupy brokerage positions in the inter-family network. Recall
that Figure 2.6 in the previous chapter provided evidence to exactly this effect. In
line with the observations presented earlier in this chapter, however, we should also
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expect that brokerage is positively associated with status among relatively lower-
status actors but not among middle- or higher-status actors. If we were to take two
otherwise similar actors, both of whom occupy relatively marginal positions within
the hierarchy of the mafia family, we should expect the one with more brokerage ties
to have relatively higher status. Among the class of mafiosi relegated to marginal po-
sitions, in other words, brokerage at least provides some kind of pathway to higher
status within the family. Figure 3.10 confirms this pattern. Among lower-status
mafiosi, whether Italian or non-Italian, there is a positive association between bridg-
ing and status. Yet again, this association attenuates above a threshold such that
the optimal arrangement is to have a balance between in- and out-group ties. Among
middle- and high-status mafiosi, in contrast, the bridge-status association is negative
or null.
3.10 Summary and Discussion
How do organizations obtain access to valued resources without diluting the loyalties
and identities of their members? Network analysts suggest focusing on the boundary-
spanning activities of brokers who bridge gaps in social structure. In many contexts,
however, brokers are viewed with suspicion and distrust rather than rewarded for
their diversity of interests. In the case of mafia families, this chapter has documented
a network ecology in which a small number of brokers—often, surprisingly, ethnic














































































































































































































































































































































































































































of criminal activity to gain power within exclusive mafia circles.
In situations where internecine exchange was uncommon, this analysis suggests
that the mafioso could fulfill both competing roles without contradiction by embed-
ding interfamily exchange in a web of brokerage maintained by ethnic outsiders who
were nonetheless known and trusted by Italian mafiosi. Doing so would provide the
mafioso with access to other families, albeit through a mediating broker, without
compromising the appearance of loyalty to his own family. Yet, it is worth also con-
sidering the precariousness of the position held by the non-Italian broker. Lacking
membership in a solidary group, he would be left largely unprotected in case of a
business dispute or aggression from a better-embedded Italian associate. While the
ethnic outsider in mafia business pursued the most advantageous position available
to him, in other words, this is not to suggest that the position was a particularly
secure one.
The analysis undertaken here has several notable limitations. Since network ties
are not measured longitudinally, we have only been able to see a snapshot—albeit a
rich one—of the network rather than the evolution of this structure over time. Rather
than behavioral traces of economic exchange between mafiosi, we have had to rely
on reported ties of criminal association. The benefit of this data structure has been
that the ties represent the widest possible set of network “pipes” through which past,
present, or even future exchanges could have occurred (Podolny 2001). Furthermore,
there is at least one reason to think that the role of non-Italians as brokers might
be even larger if we were able to observe individual instances of economic exchange
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among mafiosi. Namely, while pursuing interfamily exchange through an Italian
superior in one’s own family may provide a more direct “bridge,” the patronage
tax (i.e. the superior’s “vig”) associated with using that bridge may also be higher
than if one were to use a non-Italian intermediary. Rank-and-file Italians may have
preferred using non-Italian intermediaries when doing so allowed them to circumvent




In Chapter 2, we gained perspective on the American Mafia as a small-world struc-
ture balancing high local closure with extensive national connectivity. In Chapter 3,
we saw that this structure overlay a division of network labor in which marginal actors
in particular—including both non-Italian criminals excluded from official member-
ship and Italian criminals concentrated in the lower rungs of the family hierarchy—
took up the role of network bridges between otherwise disconnected or only loosely
connected families. In this final empirical chapter, I will examine a second key expla-
nation for network integration across mafia families: the existence of a decentralized
but nationally-connected network of mafia criminals engaged in the distribution of
illicit narcotics.
Historically, the mafioso’s “bread and butter,” so to speak, has been the market
for private protection. The connection between the mafia and the protection racket
is such that Gambetta (1993) defines the mafioso as a social and economic actor in
terms of his status as an entrepreneur of protection. Note that the term “protection”
is used here loosely—whatever material protection may actually be provided to the
mafioso’s client, the mafioso mainly demands that the client pay in order to protect
him or herself from the mafia. In this way, the mafioso is a rent-seeker. The mafioso
demands rent from the business owner, who complies in order to avoid damage to her
business, the fear of which is implied by the mafioso’s capacity for violence, which
is in turn reinforced by the mafioso’s affiliation with the feared local family, which
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maintains (by force, if necessary) a monopoly over the local protection racket in order
to ensure that any “wannabe” protection entrepreneur must pay a cost to enter the
market.
As an entrepreneur of protection, however, entrepreneurialism is arguably just
as central to the mafioso’s identity as is protectionism. Chief among the lucrative
industries and rackets to emerge outside the realm of private protection was the drug
trade, seemingly introduced to the realm of mafia business by none other than Sal-
vatore “Lucky Luciano” Lucania, the reputed “boss of bosses” in New York City and
architect of the American Mafia’s early rise to power, in the second decade of the 20th
century (Hortis 2014). While Lucania continued to surround himself with notable
drug traffickers, his personal involvement in the drug trade was later disregarded as
a “youthful indiscretion, or as a sign of his disrespect for Mafia tradition” (ibid., p.
125). Further illustrating the ambivalent relationship between mafia leaders and the
drug trade, influential New York boss Joseph Bonanno is quoted in his memoir as
stating that the mafia “tradition outlaws narcotics. It had always been understood
that ‘men of honor’ don’t deal in narcotics” (ibid.). There is every reason to suspect
that this norm was more practical than moral: the drug trade brought unwanted
attention, including newly dogged investigatory efforts from federal agencies (Maas
1969). Requiring non-local (and usually international) transportation and distribu-
tion of goods, no local family could effectively oversee and regulate the industry. The
drug business brought substantial risk—and negative externalities—with distinctly
uncertain rewards for the organization.
111
Regardless of Bonanno’s disavowal, what is clear is that many individual mafiosi
were heavily involved in the drug trade by the middle of the 20th century, so much
so that the U.S. Senate’s 1963 report on the Mafia was entitled Organized Crime
and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and the primary federal agency investigating mafia
crime was the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (the network data used throughout this
dissertation were compiled by the same agency). Fully 57 percent of the mafiosi
recorded in the data had at least some connection to the drug trade. In the five
New York City families, which by size, location, and age we might expect to hew
most closely to tradition, the prevalence actually increases to 76 percent. But as
Gambetta (1993) explains, investment in this particular industry was made on a
strictly individual rather than organizational basis: “the mafia never dealt in drugs;
only individual mafiosi did. They invested their own money or invested on behalf of
others, but nobody guaranteed that investment for them. Each man of honor had to
supply his own safeguards for his own funds” (p. 238). In his published confession,
New York mafioso Joseph Valachi similarly reports independently contacting a source
in Marseilles to import heroin under the nose of his own family (though after his capo,
Anthony Strollo, discovered the deal, he too had to receive a cut or “vig” in exchange
for his cooperation).
Why did individual mafiosi get so heavily involved in the drug trade despite
the reticence and approbation of mafia elites? A trivially simple answer is that it
was profitable. Valachi reports purchasing heroin in France at a rate of $2,500 per
kilo and selling it in the United States for $11,000 (Maas 1969). Yet this account
overfits the data in important ways. If the profit motive were a sufficient explanation,
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why did not all mafiosi go into the drug trade? To understand the origins of this
particularly consequential form of entrepreneurial deviance, we must again examine
mechanisms embedded in the social and institutional organization of mafia families.
In this chapter, I argue that rigid power hierarchies within individual families left
many lower-level members marginalized from profitable rackets. Consequently, these
mafiosi flocked in droves to the drug trade as an alternative path to enrichment,
forming a largely independent distribution network that stretched across familial,
regional, and even national boundaries.
In this way, the rise of the drug trade is best understood as a case of endogenous—
or bottom-up—rather than top-down institutional change (DellaPosta et al. 2017).
Individual mafiosi were drawn to the industry sensing an entrepreneurial opportunity
relatively free from the interference and control of family organizations. The greater
the number of mafiosi involved, the greater the ease of coordination, allowing a self-
reinforcing diffusion dynamic. And even when family leaders declined to endorse their
members’ involvement, they were also largely powerless to prevent it due to the high
gains perceived by individual mafiosi and the sheer number of mafiosi participating
in the industry (Gambetta 1993).
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I use network vi-
sualization to demonstrate the extent to which the drug trade—unlike others—linked
together individuals from disparate regions and families. Following this demonstra-
tion, I move to explain sources of individual participation in the mafia drug trade.
This explanation (briefly sketched above) is then tested in a series of statistical anal-
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yses. I conclude again by summarizing the chapter.
4.1 The Drug Trade and Network Integration
I have suggested that the drug trade was unique in the extent to which it gave rise
to integration and exchange across geographic and organizational boundaries. This
point can be illustrated by examining the sub-network of mafiosi who were involved
in the drug trade, shown in Figure 4.1. To be clear, we cannot know that all or even
most of the individual network ties in this graph were used to facilitate drug trading,
since the network ties listed by the Bureau of Narcotics are defined broadly as ties
of criminal association rather than narrowly by collaboration in specific industries
and purported transactions. We do, however, know the rackets and industries in
which individual mafiosi were known to be involved, as reported in the dossier. By
looking at the full set of ties linking together individuals who were mutually involved
in the drug trade, then, we can see the way in which participation in this particular
industry mapped onto the broader set of social and economic relationships among
mafiosi and their associated families. In this regard, what stands out in Figure 4.1
is the extensive reach of the drug trade among mafiosi and the level of integration
and interconnection across family boundaries.
To better understand how striking this pattern is, we can compare it to other
popular mafia industries. While no other single racket featured as broad-based par-
ticipation as the drug trade, Figure 4.2 graphs the sub-networks of mafiosi involved
in the three next most popular rackets: (a) gambling, bookmaking, and sports bet-
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Figure 4.1: Sub-network of mafiosi involved in the drug trade
Note: N = 404 nodes colored according to family membership.
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ting; (b) labor racketeering; and (c) liquor. The mafia gambling industry provides
an especially instructive comparison. Like the drug trade, it featured extensive and
broad-based participation (though still only roughly half as many participants). Un-
like the drug trade, however, the gambling racket was dominated by local ties within
families. When we compute Newman and Girvan’s (2004) modularity metric for these
two sub-networks, we find that modularity Q = .66 for the gambling sub-network
and Q = .39 for the drug-trading sub-network, indicating that ties between gam-
bling racketeers were dramatically more likely to occur among co-members of the
same family. (Recall that modularity adjusts for the size and degree distribution of
the network, meaning that this difference is also not attributable to the larger size
of the drug-trading sub-network.)
This pattern makes intuitive sense given the nature of each industry. Whereas
drug-trading required moving goods across geographic space, the gambling racket
involved close collaboration in managing bookmaking, lotteries, and other forms of
betting and gambling within a locally defined space. Valachi’s description of the
“numbers” racket (Maas 1969)—a lottery in which bettors attempt to predict three
digits determined pseudo-randomly (e.g. by the final three digits of the total amount
traded that day on the stock market)—illustrates the kinds of local ties developed in
the context of gambling racketeering. When Valachi saw bets coming in heavily on
any one set of numbers for a particular day, he would insure himself against potential
damage by placing his own bet on the same numbers with a different bookmaker. In
other words, the racketeers agreed to form ties in order to spread costs across the local
gambling market. The costs that required managing in the drug trade were clearly
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Figure 4.2: Sub-networks for gambling, labor, and liquor industries
Note: Nodes colored according to family membership.
different, involving the identification of suppliers in other regions or countries and
the effective transportation of goods from one place to another. Even if mafia leaders
wanted to monopolize and manage the drug trade in the way that they managed the
gambling racket and other industries, doing so would have been virtually impossible.
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4.2 Hierarchy and Entrepreneurial Deviance
What, then, accounts for the broad-based nature of mafia participation in the drug
trade? This is often intuitively viewed as evidence that mafia families lacked formal
organization—otherwise, how could so many mafiosi blatantly disregard the prefer-
ences of their superiors? A subtler explanation, however, is that mafiosi were driven
into the drug trade precisely because of the way families were organized. Rather than
lacking organization, well-defined hierarchies and power structures within mafia fam-
ilies left many members in a position where they would gain more by forming their
own “private orders” beyond the tight internal labor markets of the family-controlled
rackets.
A recorded tape of two New Jersey mafiosi, Anthony Russo and Sam Decavalcante
(the FBI tapped Decavalcante’s phones between 1961 and 1965 and released the
transcripts publicly in 1969), helps to illustrate the forces that led rank-and-file
mafiosi into the drug trade. Russo opines to Decavalcante:
“Half these guys are handling junk. Now there’s a law out that they can’t
touch it. They have no other way of making a living so what can they
do? All right, we’re fortunate enough that we moved around and didn’t
have to resort to that stuff. We had legitimate things going as well as
horses, numbers, and everything. What are the other poor suckers going
to do?” (quoted in Abadinsky 1981, p. 24)
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Russo’s explanation is that mafiosi went into the drug trade when they could not
otherwise secure enough profit from the traditional rackets, examples of which include
legitimate businesses, sports betting, and the numbers lottery. It is notable that the
alternative rackets Russo lists are distinctly local in nature, and thus more amenable
to control and regulation by the family. Thus, the mafiosi who would be excluded
from such rackets would be those who occupy a less advantageous position within
the family’s web of hierarchical patron-client relationships.
Gould (1996) argues that patronage systems have two countervailing effects: (a)
co-opting those who occupy beneficial positions in the patron-client structure into
cooperation; and (b) pushing those who occupy disadvantaged positions in the same
structure into resistance. In the case of the mafia drug trade, I expect that mafiosi
who occupied weaker positions in the patron-client structure of the family had fewer
opportunities for material gain and advancement within the organization and sorted
into the drug trade as an alternative path to enrichment. To state this proposition
more formally,
H4: Higher-status mafiosi were less likely to be involved in the drug trade.
In the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, it was common for numerous mafia families to com-
pete for influence and territory within the same city. In 1990, for example, the city of
Palermo alone featured nearly 50 families; Agrigento featured nearly 40 (Gambetta
1993, p. 291). These families tend to be small and clan-like in structure. However,
American mafia families emerged by the mid-20th century with a distinctly different
organizational structure. Rather than many small families occupying the same ge-
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ographic territory, the American Mafia featured a much smaller number of families
(the total number across the United States being less than the number of families
in Palermo alone) with much larger individual memberships. The two largest New
York City families (Genovese and Lucchese) each feature more than 100 of the 707
mafiosi in the data set, making these groups resemble hierarchical multidivisional
firms more than small, secretive clans.
One consequence of such elaborated, multilevel hierarchies is to effectively insu-
late the organization’s top-level leadership from the day-to-day activities of rank-
and-file members (Blau 1968). This had two practical implications. First, the ex-
istence of a rigid and coherent hierarchy implied for lower-level members that the
path to advancement within the family would be more difficult. Within an inflexible
hierarchical structure, then, the incentives for individuals occupying mid- or lower-
level positions to seek opportunities outside the family’s patron-client structure were
greater. Second, the existence of multiple levels separating family leadership from
lower-level subordinates allowed the latter greater room to maneuver without direct
supervision from the former. As Erikson and Bearman (2006) point out, “in the
absence of control, rational agents pursue their own private interests, most often free
riding off of collective resources provided by principals” (p. 203). In the case of the
mafia drug trade, individual mafiosi insulated from the direct supervision and con-
trol of family leaders used the legitimacy and network connections garnered through
affiliation with the family to wade into an alternative private order of drug-traders.
Stated more formally, I expect the following:
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H5: More hierarchical families featured higher rates of participation in the drug
trade.
4.3 Measuring Hierarchy
How do we distinguish families on the basis of having more or less hierarchical
structures? Recall that in Chapters 2 and 3 we used the set of directed nominations
from the criminal profiles provided by the Bureau of Narcotics dossier to capture the
relative “pecking order” of each family, following the principle that a mafiosi A who
appears in B ’s list of criminal associates when B does not also appear in A’s list of
associates was likely to be a higher-priority and more influential actor than B. We
can estimate the extent of hierarchical relationships within each of the 24 families
by again applying this principle.
As before, I separately analyze the network of directed nominations for each
family. I begin this analysis by removing all sets of mutual nominations in which A
and B both appear in one another’s lists of criminal associates, since these mutually
directed ties will not directly tell us about hierarchical relations within the family.
Using the remaining set of non-mutual relationships, I measure the coherence of the
family hierarchy based on the presence of cycles among the non-mutual nominations.
A cycle occurs when A nominates B who nominates C who nominates A. In the
presence of clear and rigid hierarchies among actors, such cycles should not occur.
A’s un-returned nomination of B implies that B > A. Similarly, B ’s un-returned
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nomination of C implies that C > B. By the transitive property, then, A cannot
be ranked higher than C ; yet, C ’s un-returned nomination of A implies exactly this.
In a group featuring flat and horizontal relationships among actors and the absence
of a clear hierarchy, such cycles may frequency occur. In a group featuring vertical
relationships and a clear hierarchy, they should be rare or non-existent.
More formally, for each actor i in family f I measure the extent of non-hierarchical






di(di − 1) (4.1)
where j indexes all alters whom i nominates; k indexes other alters; aij is a binary
indicator of the presence or absence of a directed nomination from i to j; and di is the
number of outgoing nominations from i. Stated differently, Cif measures the number
of non-hierarchical cycles i generates relative to the number of possible such cycles
based on i’s nominations to other actors. For cases in which i lacks any outgoing
un-returned nominations (di = 0), Cif = 0 to indicate the absence of any non-
hierarchical cycles. Since a higher score indicates the relative absence of hierarchy,







Reflecting the tendency for mafia families to be relatively hierarchical in struc-
ture, the resulting scores are high on average in the unit interval between 0 and
1. Yet, despite the seemingly subtle differences, the measure also identifies distinct
122
patterns of organization across families. Figure 4.3 plots the network of directed
ties in the Pittsburgh family, which this measure identifies as featuring a weak hi-
erarchy (Hf = .73). The absence of coherent hierarchical relations is striking in
the plot, which depicts extensive mutual ties among members and a relatively flat
structure. In contrast, Figure 4.4 similarly plots the directed relations within the
nearby Cleveland family, identified as having a much stronger hierarchy (Hf = .99).
Here, the depicted structure is narrow and vertical, reflecting the division of the
family into multiple distinct and hierarchically ordered realms of influence, with the
different power centers acting as “hubs” at the center of the graph surrounded by
less influential and subordinate “spokes.”
4.4 Models of Drug Trade Involvement
Table 4.1 presents a series of nested multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions pre-
dicting each mafioso’s participation or non-participation in the drug trade. Most
of the covariates included in these models have previously appeared in Chapter 3.
Consistent with hypothesis H4, Model 1 shows that mafiosi who attended the 1957
Apalachin meeting—a key indicator of high esteem in mafia circles—were 70 percent
less likely to be involved in the drug trade (found by exponentiating the logit coeffi-
cient). Younger mafiosi were more likely to be drug trade participants, which can be
explained by the tendency for older mafiosi to have accrued greater status within the
family hierarchy. Mafioso who owned an interest in at least one legitimate business
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Figure 4.3: Example of weak hierarchy
Note: Nodes are sized according to in-degree. The network of directed nominations is plotted using
the Fruchterman-Reingold spring-embedding algorithm.
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Figure 4.4: Example of strong hierarchy
Note: Nodes are sized according to in-degree. The network of directed nominations is plotted using
the Fruchterman-Reingold spring-embedding algorithm.
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were 65 percent less likely to be involved in the drug trade, lending empirical support
to Anthony Russo’s suggestion that he and colleagues who had access to legitimate
revenue streams were better positioned to stay away from drug-trading.
Model 2 shows that each of these patterns remains when controlling for family-
level features. Family size is not correlated with rates of participation in the drug
trade in any precise way. However, mafiosi belonging to one of the five New York City
families were more than 4 times as likely to have ties to the drug trade. I also adjust
separately for non-urban families, which I define as those located in a city with fewer
than 500,000 residents as of 1960 (Pittston, Elizabeth, Springfield, Omaha, Tampa,
Kansas City, and Denver). We would expect that these families had markedly less
access to the metropolitan centers of drug distribution; and indeed, members of such
families were less likely to be involved in the drug trade, although this difference is
not very precisely estimated in the model. Finally, Model 3 introduces the measure
of family hierarchy. Consistent with hypothesis H5, the results show that more
hierarchical families had dramatically higher rates of participation in the drug trade.
To see how dramatic, consider that a member of the vertically organized Cleveland
family is here estimated to be 116 times as likely to participate in the drug trade as
someone in the horizontally organized Pittsburgh family. Controlling for hierarchy,
however, we can also see a clearer difference between urban- and non-urban families,
suggesting that non-urban families tended to be less hierarchical but also less likely
to participate in the drug trade.
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Table 4.1: Multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions of drug trade participation
(1) (2) (3)
Apalachin -1.18** -1.22** -1.24**
(-2.02, -.33) (-1.98, -.35) (-2.11, -.42)
Non-Italian 1.11 1.14 1.13
(-.35, 2.28) (-.33, 2.45) (-.56, 2.84)
Age -.04** -.04** -.04**
(-.07, -.01) (-.06, -.01) (-.06, -.01)
Immigrant .08 .02 .02
(-.45, .59) (-.57, .49) (-.52, .59)
Legitimate business -1.04*** -1.05*** -1.04***
(-1.55, -.52) (-1.52, -.64) (-1.50, -.55)
Non-criminal occupation -.09 -.16 -.15
(-.73, .52) (-.77, .48) (-.79, .44)
Kin ties .08 .10 .09
(-.12, .27) (-.11, .30) (-.10, .27)
Family size .00 .00
(-.01, .02) (-.01, .02)
N.Y.C. family 1.48* 1.42
(.05, 2.92) (.10, 2.88)
Non-urban family -.95 -1.46*
(-2.46, .28) (-3.05, -.11)
Hierarchy 18.26*
(2.48, 35.10)
Intercept .36 .17 .18
(-.52, 1.08) (-.55, .97) (-.57, .90)
Residual Variance:
Family-level 2.23 .88 .76
(.61, 4.32) (.09, 2.12) (.04, 1.69)
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Note: N = 707. Age, family size, and
hierarchy are mean-centered. Models are estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods. Logit coefficients are shown with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses.
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4.5 Summary and Discussion
More than any other mafia industry, the drug trade connected mafiosi operating
across the United States. This fact, in and of itself, tells us something important: If
the industry that did the most to integrate networks across organizational boundaries
was also the one most disapproved by mafia elites and family leaders, this is rather
striking evidence against elite coordination as the key mechanism explaining the ex-
istence of an integrated and cohesive national network. If the widespread popularity
of the drug trade among rank-and-file members in some sense indicated an absence
of organizational control over members, however, it is also notable that the rigid
and hierarchical structure of family organizations was seemingly part of what drove
individual criminals into this path of entrepreneurial deviance outside the family-
controlled rackets. For this reason, as suggested earlier, the analysis undertaken in
this chapter helps to further crystallize the core empirical argument I have advanced
in this dissertation: That entrepreneurial action by marginal actors operating largely
beyond the boundaries of family organizations themselves paradoxically gave rise to
the cohesive national structure we have in mind when we talk of “The American
Mafia.”
There are notable limitations to the analyses presented here, however, and fur-
ther investigation is needed. In particular, the use of cross-sectional data heavily
circumscribes any claim to causality in the regression analyses. I have relied upon
attendance at the 1957 Apalachin meeting (also see Chapter 3) to distinguish the
elite family leaders who were hypothesized (and shown) to have avoided involvement
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in the drug trade. Compared to the continuous pagerank measure I have used else-
where to measure individual status, Apalachin attendance seems at least less likely
to reflect causal endogeneity. It remains plausible that previous involvement in the
drug trade may have tarnished any particular mafioso’s reputation enough to cause
him to not be included in the Apalachin meeting; yet, this account is also not in-
consistent with the narrative presented here. What I have hoped to demonstrate is
the extent to which the drug trade existed as an alternative private order apart from
more standard and approved mafia rackets, and one in which the participants were




What was the American Mafia? A national conspiracy directed from the top-
down through a Weberian-style bureaucracy? A mythical entity comprised only of
locally-rooted, organizationally unrelated clusters of Italian-American criminals? In
the end, it is perhaps not too surprising to find that the answer is both and nei-
ther. The American Mafia was, in some sense, a national conspiracy—the network
of mafia criminals in the United States was connected and integrated such that a
mafioso in Providence could reach one in San Francisco through just a few intermedi-
aries. However, this conspiracy was not directed from the top-down, as imagined by
policymakers, scholars, and citizens convinced of a Cosa Nostra conspiracy. Rather,
the connected conspiracy of the American Mafia reflected in important ways the
bottom-up, entrepreneurial activity of outsiders excluded from the power structures
that dominated mafia organizations themselves.
It is not surprising that this subtlety of social and economic organization could
be missed by contemporary observers. However, it is also presents a great historical
irony. The Italian-American Mafia has been a social, political, and cultural touch-
stone precisely because of its alluring (or frightening) “conspiratorialness.” While
Commissions and national meetings had some role in this structure, however, the
other forces that gave the American Mafia its signature cohesion were largely unin-
tended. In fact, they were intended to do quite the opposite. Rules of ethnic and
organizational closure were designed to restrict access to mafia-controlled resources
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to a closed circle of eligibles, thereby reinforcing closure—but they also drove non-
Italians and lower-status Italians into brokerage roles. Strict hierarchies were meant
to increase the mafioso’s dependence on the family, thereby producing loyal orga-
nization men—but they also drove marginal mafiosi into the drug trade when their
path to opportunity within the family appeared blocked.
A further irony is that the same forces that seemingly produced the cohesive
and integrated mafia network also brought about the Mafia’s downfall. As noted in
Chapter 4, one practical reason why mafia leaders opposed the drug trade was that
they knew it would bring unwanted attention from federal law enforcement agencies
previously uninterested in investigating local urban criminal rackets. And bring
attention it did, including the U.S. Senate investigations and Bureau of Narcotics
dossier relied upon extensively throughout this dissertation. A couple of decades
later, after having been the focus of sustained and long-term enforcement efforts,
many of the mafia organizations analyzed here would be reduced to a shell of their
former selves.
We should of course be cautious not to draw overly broad conclusions from a study
of mafia families in one country and historical period. However, the mechanisms un-
derlying the dynamics of mafia organization—especially institutional closure and its
intended and unintended consequences—are sufficiently general to invite extensions
of the argument to other contexts. In congressional politics, for example, lobbyists,
think tanks, and advocacy groups—none of whom hold elected office—likely play a
key brokerage role between otherwise only weakly connected ideological or regional
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cliques. When local politics are infused with familistic and parochial interests, ge-
ographic outsiders are often preferred as arbitrators (Simmel 1971). The common
thread is that fractious institutional arrangements permitting solidary groups to
hoard resources away from the reach of potential competitors often have the unfore-
seen or unintended consequence of empowering those who act outside the constraints
of parochial control. Nor is there any particular reason to think that the dynamics
observed in an institutional field typified by “strong” rules of closure—such as the
mafia—would fail to appear in cases of “weak” closure, such as when individuals
simply prefer to interact within their own group. Examples abound in studies of
ethnic and religious boundaries, from Simmel’s (1971) analysis of European Jews as
migrant traders to Bonacich’s (1973) classic work on “middleman minorities” who
play the role of broker by buffering exchange across class lines. Up to now, the
Weberian concept of closure has found its widest application in studies of regulation
and licensing in professions and occupations (Weeden 2002). Its usefulness should
not be limited to such work.
Even when network position is shown to be a robust predictor of access to in-
formation and other resources, network analysis has often been criticized as mere
description—the implication being that the deeper causal mechanisms lie elsewhere
(Borgatti et al. 2009). However, institutional theorists of varying stripes have pre-
ferred to see network and non-network mechanisms as mutually reinforcing (DiMag-
gio and Powell 1983; Nee and Opper 2012; Powell et al. 2005). Consistent with
this perspective, the analysis undertaken here demonstrates how informal norms and
formal rules embedded in the institutional environment guide and constrain agency,
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including the formation of network ties, and are in turn reinforced or undermined by
meso-level interactions between actors linked in network space. When institutions are
transplanted across time and space, furthermore, they can affect network structure
in non-straightforward ways, such as when rules meant to lend cohesion, stability,
and closure among Sicilian mafia families unintendedly produce opportunities for
brokerage and integration when transplanted to the American context.
We also typically think that institutions operate efficiently by constraining the
behavioral options available to actors and encouraging uniform or predictable be-
havior across a population. However, the counterpoint is that some institutions are
strong precisely because they support a multiplicity of interests and roles. For exam-
ple, Dobbin (2009) argues that strong equal opportunity regulations in the workplace
emerged not because of clear and uniform expectations set by civil rights-era laws, but
rather precisely because the ambiguity of these laws created space for a multiplicity
of professional and political interests who understood compliance in many different
ways. In the American Mafia as analyzed here, rules and norms originally intended
to enforce closure and solidarity within families in fact produced a multiplicity of
interests and roles among members and associates of the organization.
Beginning with Simmel, social theorists have long equated “outsiderism” with
a unique capability for the brokerage activity that produces greater cohesion and
integration across otherwise disconnected social circles. This dissertation has sug-
gested that this capability is conditional on key elements of social and economic
organization. Yet, there are other differences. Unlike the European Jews discussed
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by Simmel and “middleman minorities” more broadly, non-Italian criminals in mafia
circles (to take the example from Chapter 3) were neither migrant sojourners nor
socioeconomically disadvantaged outcasts. In many (perhaps most) cases, they were
locally established veteran criminals who had once been affiliated with one of the
Jewish-American syndicates that predated the rise of Italian-American mafia fam-
ilies. Neither were their ties with Italian mafiosi necessarily weak and transient
in nature—collaborative enterprises between Italian and non-Italian criminals (es-
pecially in the drug trade) could persist over the course of many years. Ethnic
limitations on membership notwithstanding, exchange across ethnic boundaries still
seemingly occurred with little reprobation.
This suggests that outsiders are perhaps best suited to the brokerage activity
often attributed to them when they are outsiders de jure only—when the rules that
define group membership clash with concrete exchange relations that readily stretch
across membership lines. In this nebulous territory, defined by the disjuncture be-
tween formal rules and informal relations, the outsider is able to transform into a
partial insider of multiple groups.
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